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Thursday, September 21, 2006

THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: "RING OF HELL"

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109
THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN THE PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
Frank J. Cavico*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................... 110
II. Background and Controlling Law ............................................. 111
III. Elements of the Cause of Action ............................................... 113
A. Introduction........................................................................ 113
B. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct...................................... 116
1. Extreme Outrage v. Insults and Indignities .................. 116
C. Intent................................................................................... 128
1. Requisite Intention........................................................ 128
2. Recklessness v. Negligence.......................................... 128
3. Transferred Intent......................................................... 130
D. Distress............................................................................... 130
1. Actual Severe Distress.................................................. 130
2. Reasonableness of Aggrieved Party’s Distress............. 134
3. Physical or Bodily Harm or Impact.............................. 136
4. Intensity and Duration of Distress: Single or Isolated
Acts v. Regularity or Patterns of Distress................... 137
5. Particularly Sensitive or Susceptible Plaintiffs............. 138
6. Abuse of Relation or Position v. Assertion of Legal
Rights or Legitimate Interest...................................... 141
7. Acts or Conduct Directed at Third Persons.................. 143
E. Causation............................................................................ 145
F. Damages............................................................................. 146
1. Compensatory Damages............................................... 146
* The author is a Professor of Business Law and Ethics at the H. Wayne Huizenga School
of Business and Entrepreneurship of Nova Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. He
holds a J.D. from St. Mary’s University School of Law (1976), a L.L.M. from the University of San
Diego School of Law (1987), an M.A. from Drew University and a B.A. from Gettysburg College.
The author is a member of the Texas and Florida Bar Associations. The author wishes to express his
thanks and gratitude to Mrs. Stephanie Ferrari, MBA-Finance Candidate at the Huizenga School, for
her assiduous and able assistance in the editing and legal research for this article.
110
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
2. Punitive Damages......................................................... 148
IV. Vicarious Liability..................................................................... 149
V. Outrage and Anti-Discrimination Statutes................................. 153
A. Racial Discrimination or Harassment................................. 153
B. Sexual Harassment ............................................................. 156
VI. Outrage as an Exception to Employment-At-Will..................... 157
VII. Defenses and Privileges............................................................. 161
A. Generic Intentional Tort Defenses and Privileges.............. 161
B. Arbitration.......................................................................... 162
C. Statutes of Limitations........................................................ 163
D. Preemption and Exclusivity................................................ 163
1. State Statutes ................................................................ 163
2. Federal Statutes ............................................................ 166
E. First Amendment Concerns................................................ 170
VIII. Burdens of Proof and Persuasion and Roles of Court and
Jury .......................................................................................... 171
IX. Recommendations ..................................................................... 177
X. Conclusion................................................................................. 180
I. I
NTRODUCTION
This article will examine the now-established common law tort
cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in a
modern employment context. Claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress have arisen in a wide variety of situations. One such situa-
tion is the private employment sector, specifically in cases where the
employee believes he or she was treated or terminated in an unfair, abu-
sive, coercive, or retaliatory manner. The article will thus examine the
components of the tort and its applicability to the private employment
sector. An important objective of this article will be to ascertain the effi-
cacy of this tort in the private employment setting, especially consider-
ing the predominant at will nature of the employment relationship. Con-
sequently, the article will also examine the efficacy of this tort as a
means of regulating unjust conduct in the workplace and the potential
“exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine for an independent tort
of wrongful discharge. Similarly, the article will seek to determine the
effectiveness of the tort as a distinct state common law legal “vehicle,”
as well as a count of a larger statutory federal or state discrimination and
harassment lawsuit. The types of damages that can be recovered for a
violation of this tort will also be addressed, as will the various defenses
to the tort, especially the possibility of the tort’s preemption by either
state workers’ compensation law or federal and/or state civil rights or la-
bor law. Finally, this article will discuss certain practical recommenda-
tions for pleading, maintaining and proving this tort in the private em-
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
111
ployment context. Before this cause of action can be examined in the
private employment context, it is first necessary to understand the gen-
eral background and historical information of the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.
II. B
ACKGROUND AND
C
ONTROLLING
L
AW
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as a stand-
alone legal wrong, has had a difficult journey in the history of the com-
mon law. As one state supreme court related, “[a]t first, the courts re-
fused to permit recovery for ‘mental pain and anxiety’ and adopted the
view of Lord Wensleydale on the belief that ‘the law cannot value and
does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes
that alone.’”
1
In the “earlier law,” according to Dobbs’ treatise on torts,
“damages could not be recovered for stand-alone emotional harm,” al-
though this excepted the seemingly always “exceptional” common carri-
ers, innkeepers and, later, telegraph companies because these groups
have a duty to exercise civility toward customers.
2
Prosser and Keeton
relate that in the old common law, “if some independent tort, such as as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction could be made out, the
cause of action served as a peg upon which to hang the mental damages,
and recovery was freely permitted.”
3
Furthermore, “[i]t has gradually
become recognized that there is no magic inherent in the name given to a
tort, or in any arbitrary classification, and that the infliction of mental
injury may be a cause of action in itself.”
4
Nevertheless, “courts began to
allow damages for mental anguish when the accompanying physical in-
jury was slight or non-existent. Scholars chronicled the development of
the law in this area and lamented over the hypocrisy of the legal stan-
dard.”
5
Nonetheless,
[n]otwithstanding early recognition of a cause of action in assault
cases, the law has been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as
entitled to independent legal protection, even as against intentional in-
vasions. Not until comparatively recent decades has the infliction of
1. Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1996) (citing Lynch v. Knight, 9
H.L.C. 557, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861)).
2. D
AN
B. D
OBBS
, T
HE
L
AW OF
T
ORTS
§ 303, at 824 (2000).
3. W. P
AGE
K
EETON ET AL
., P
ROSSER AND
K
EETON ON THE
L
AW OF
T
ORTS
§12, at 57 (5th
ed. 1984).
4. Id.
5. Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 64.
112
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
mental distress served as the basis of an action, apart from any other
tort. In this respect, the law is clearly in a process of growth, the ulti-
mate limits of which cannot yet be determined.
6
Around 1930, according to Prosser and Keeton, the wrong of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress by means of outrageous and ex-
treme conduct began to be recognized as a separate and distinct cause of
action.
7
According to one state supreme court, a critical factor in the de-
velopment of the law was the publication of a 1939 article, “Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Suffering: A New Tort,” in the Michigan Law
Review, by Dean William L. Prosser.
8
In that landmark publication,
Dean Prosser “encouraged the courts to provide clarity and ‘to jettison
the entire cargo of technical torts with which the real cause of action has
been burdened.’”
9
A milestone in the development of the law occurred in
1948, when in a supplement to the Restatement of Torts, the American
Law Institute for the first time recognized a separate and independent
tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
10
The principal im-
pediment to the development of the tort had been the fear that the protec-
tion of interests in mental peace of mind would be “the ‘wide door’
which might be opened, not only to fictitious claims, but to litigation in
the field of trivialities and mere bad manners.”
11
However,
“[r]ecognition of the tort by the drafters of the Restatement led to its ac-
ceptance by the courts, ‘the elements of the tort as described in the Re-
statement being widely accepted and quoted.’”
12
Extensive common law exists today to explicate the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, including employment tort case
law.
13
However, most states set a very high legal and factual standard for
the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
14
As
6. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 54–55.
7. See id. at 60.
8. Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 65.
9. Id.
10. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 303, at 825; see also Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 65.
11. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 56.
12. Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 65; see also Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress and Employment At Will: The Case Against ‘Tortification’ of Labor and Employment Law,
74 B.U. L. R
EV
. 387, 392 (1994) (“Only in recent decades has the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress been recognized as an independent tort.”).
13. Duffy, supra note 12, at 390 (“Recognized in virtually every state, there has been a
wholesale attempt to apply the tort in the employment context as a way of challenging alleged
workplace inequities and abuse by supervisors and managers.”).
14. See Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that,
under Mississippi law, sexual harassment does not necessarily equate to intentional infliction even if
malicious); Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that under Kan-
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
113
one court emphasized, “[t]he standard for successfully pursuing a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is high.”
15
Prosser and
Keeton concurs that “[t]he requirements of the rule are rigorous, and dif-
ficult to satisfy.”
16
Many states use the Restatement (Second) of Torts
formulations for the tort, especially to set the standard for sufficiently
offending conduct.
17
III. E
LEMENTS OF THE
C
AUSE OF
A
CTION
A. Introduction
Before examining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in the private sector employment context, it is first necessary to
state the standard four elements to the tort. In order to prevail in a law-
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff typically
must show the following: (1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional
distress; (2) the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous;
(3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress;
and (4) the resulting emotional distress to the plaintiff was severe.
18
Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[o]ne who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.”
19
Prosser and Keeton explain that:
[s]o far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the rule which
seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding
all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is es-
sas law, even termination from employment based on “unlawful motive” of race discrimination is
insufficient).
15. Leavitt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316–17 (D. Me. 2003).
16. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 60–61.
17. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Delphi Auto. Sys., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1072 (S.D. Ohio 2003);
Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., L.L.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793–94 (W.D.N.C.
2002); Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 67; LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); see also James L. Bleeke, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Em-
ployment At Will Setting: Limiting the Employer’s Manner of Discharge, 60 I
ND
. L.J. 365, 366–67
(1985) (“The action, as defined in the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts has been adopted in most
jurisdictions . . . .”).
18. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 303, at 826 (“Almost all courts recognize the tort and apply these
basic rules.”).
19. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46(1) (1965).
114
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
pecially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very
serious kind.
20
The standard and often repeated elements to the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress are naturally required to sustain the tort in an
employment context.
21
Yet, as one federal court noted, “North Carolina
courts have been particularly hesitant in finding intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims actionable within an employment claim.”
22
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has been emphatic in emphasizing
the hurdle an employee confronts in sustaining his or her workplace in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
23
“In the workplace,
while an employer’s conduct might in some instances be unpleasant, the
employer must have some discretion to ‘supervise, review, criticize, de-
mote, transfer, and discipline’ its workers.” The court declined to recog-
nize intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in ordinary em-
ployment disputes, but rather held that such claims can exist “only in the
most unusual circumstances.”
24
20. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 60.
21. See Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 320 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law);
Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying Kentucky law); Humble v.
Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Washington law); Greenwood, 257 F.
Supp. 2d at 1072; Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New
Jersey law); Wait v. Beck’s N. Am., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180–81 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Leavitt v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 238 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316–17 (D. Me. 2003); Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp.,
233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1137–38 (N.D. Iowa 2002); Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp.
2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Jackson, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 794; McClease v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Paraohoa v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp.
2d 1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002);
Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Bator v. Yale-New Haven
Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Nicholson v. Windham, 571 S.E.2d 466, 470
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000); Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Kroger, 920
S.W.2d at 65; LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Rigby v.
Fallsway Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d 1056, 1064 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611
(Tex. 1999); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 405 (Tex. App. 2002); Robel v. Roundup
Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
22. Jackson, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
23. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 611.
24. Id. This reasoning has been applied in a subsequent Texas appellate court case, which
adopted a strict approach to emotional distress claims arising in the workplace, explaining that to
manage a business properly, an employer must be able to supervise, review, criticize, demote, trans-
fer, and discipline employees. The court pointed out that “[a]lthough many of these acts are neces-
sarily unpleasant for the employee, an employer must have latitude to exercise these rights in a per-
missible way, even though emotional distress results.” Jackson, 84 S.W.3d at 405–06.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
115
Similarly, one commentator has noted that “[i]n order to properly
manage its business, every employer must on occasion review, criticize,
demote, transfer and discipline employees.”
25
Therefore, employers are
aware that such adverse personnel decisions may instill distress in their
employees and that these employees “may consider any such adverse ac-
tion to be improper and outrageous.”
26
Arguably, unfavorable employ-
ment decisions will likely cause some employees to suffer emotional dis-
tress.
27
Accordingly, federal district courts have noted, “[i]t is extremely
rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level
of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
28
Similarly, another fed-
eral district court noted that “[t]o say that Ohio courts narrowly define
‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ would be something of an under-
statement.”
29
Furthermore, Florida courts are generally reluctant to find
that an employer’s actions rise to the level of outrageous conduct.
30
However, there is some obverse authority for the proposition that if
the allegedly outrageous and extreme conduct inflicted on an employee
occurs at the workplace and in the vicinity of one’s fellow employees,
the fact that the workplace is involved adds weight to the employee’s
outrage claim.
31
The Texas Supreme Court, although adopting a very
conservative approach to the tort in the employment context, has com-
mented that
[i]n the employment context, some courts have held that a plaintiff’s
status as an employee should entitle him to a greater degree of protec-
tion from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him
than if he were a stranger. . . . This approach is based partly on the ra-
tionale that, as opposed to most casual and temporary relationships, the
25. Duffy, supra note 12, at 416.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New Jersey
law); Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law).
29. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 962 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting
Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1993)).
30. Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
31. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002) (emphasizing that employee was
called extremely vulgar names in her workplace); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (noting that “[t]he impact of such outrageous conduct is exacerbated where, as here,
the offender was also the employer of the victim.”).
116
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
workplace environment provides a captive victim and the opportunity
for prolonged abuse.
32
Similarly, another court also explained that “[i]n an employment con-
text, the coercive pressure upon an employee to accede to the unaccept-
able demands and insults of the employer is greatly intensified by the
implied threat of job loss or job erosion in the event of non-
compliance.”
33
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can stand
alone as an independent intentional tort or can be a separate claim in an
employee’s discrimination or sexual harassment suit.
34
The tort action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress also survives the death of
the aggrieved party.
35
B. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
1. Extreme Outrage v. Insults and Indignities
The key element to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is the presence of extreme and outrageous conduct. The diffi-
culty in establishing liability under this intentional tort is that the term
“outrageousness, one of the tort’s key elements, lacks a specific defini-
tion. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has noted that, “‘[e]xtreme and outrageous
conduct’ is an amorphous phrase that escapes precise definition.”
36
Simi-
larly, one commentator has criticized the tort because liability is deter-
mined “almost exclusively on the basis of the outrageousness of the de-
fendant’s conduct . . . [and] there is no clear definition of the prohibited
conduct. Rather than describing an objective act or series of acts on
which liability can be based, ‘outrageousness’ represents generalized
evaluation of behavior.”
37
Nevertheless, many definitions have been asserted.
38
According to
32. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999).
33. Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1251 (discussing sexual harassment conduct).
34. Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002).
35. Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 987, 989–90 (Mass. 1979) (ex-
plaining how the intentional infliction of emotional distress is treated the same as battery and assault
pursuant to the state survivability statute).
36. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5thCir. 1991).
37. Duffy, supra note 12, at 394.
38. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 §§ 304–07, at 826–35; K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 60–65;
R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 (1965).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
117
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, conduct is considered to be extreme
and outrageous “only where the conduct has been so outrageous in char-
acter, and so extreme in degree, so as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.”
39
Many courts refer explicitly to the Restatement
when deciding the “outrage” issue.
40
The “outrage” formulation stated in
Prosser and Keeton is similar to the Restatement stating, “[t]here is li-
ability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent so-
ciety . . . .”
41
Dobbs posits the outrageousness standard as “utterly intol-
erable” conduct which “goes beyond all bounds of civilized society.”
42
In several jurisdictions, the legal standard of extreme and outra-
geous conduct involves conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond the bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable.”
43
The conduct, according
to some courts, must be “atrocious,”
44
“go beyond all possible bounds of
decency,”
45
and “exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civi-
lized society.”
46
Another court declared that the conduct must evoke “re-
vulsion” to be deemed legally outrageous.
47
All these definitions and
39. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. d (1965).
40. See, e.g., Higgins v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 2003); Moss v.
Camp Pemigewassett, Inc. 312 F.3d 503, 510–11 (1st Cir. 2002); Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 599 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J.
1988)); Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (W.D.N.C.
2002); Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Indiana Ct. App. 2002) (citing Conwell
v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)); Rigby v. Fallsway Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d
1056, 1064–65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (citing Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio
1983)); Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002) (citing Twyman
v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)).
41. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 60.
42. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at 827.
43. Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New Jersey
law); Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Briggs, 218
F. Supp. 2d at 1263; Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
44. Bush v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780, 800 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Yeager
v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983)); Carnemolla, 815 A.2d at 1260.
45. Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 405 (Tex. App. 2002). In Jackson, the court
reversed summary judgment for the former employer. Id. The court found that there were general
issues of material fact as to whether it was outrageous for the former employer to threaten the
roommate of the former employee with termination so as to have the former employee evicted from
the home they shared. Id. at 408.
46. Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (citing Ward v. Bechtel, 102 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir.
1997)); Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Utah 2002) (holding that the
level of conduct would not have been sufficiently outrageous to “a reasonable person” pursuant to
state law (citing White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))).
47. Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Mississippi
law and noting that sexual harassment alone was not sufficiently atrocious).
118
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
formulations provide some limited guidance as to the meaning of “ex-
treme and outrageous” conduct, yet not enough clarity, according to one
commentator, who worries that “[t]he tort carries with it the twin dan-
gers of leaving the defendant to guess which conduct is prohibited while
permitting the courts to ‘enforce laws in an arbitrary and discriminatory
fashion.’”
48
However, behavior on the part of the defendant which is an affront,
that displays bad manners, petty oppressions or other trivialities or that is
merely insensitive, rude, insulting, indignant or annoying, is insufficient
to constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
49
For
example, according to one federal district court, a male worker being
given a brief massage by a female co-worker, having his hand measured,
having female co-workers stand close to him, as well as making a num-
ber of sexual comments to him, although termed “clearly . . . inappropri-
ate” conduct by the court, was deemed to be merely “‘insults, indigni-
ties, and annoyances,’” that did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct as a matter of law.
50
As to “trivialities and bad man-
ners,” Prosser and Keeton states that “[i]t would be absurd for the law to
seek to secure universal peace of mind, and many interferences with it
must of necessity be left to other agencies of social control.”
51
Similarly,
conduct which is regarded merely as “intemperate,” “rough,” “insensi-
tive,” or “rude” will not meet the legal “outrage” standard.
52
In a most illustrating “intemperate” case,
53
which clearly shows the
difficulty of establishing this tort in an employment context, the em-
ployee contended that her employer and its top management asked her to
sign a false affidavit, and when she refused, one defendant made a ra-
cially discriminatory statement to her.
54
Soon thereafter, she was dis-
48. Duffy, supra note 12 at 394.
49. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. d. (1965); K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 §
12, at 59–60; D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at 826–27; see also Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp.,
232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2003); Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002);
Rigby, 779 N.E.2d at 1065; Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 610; Robel v.
Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620 (Wash. 2002).
50. Greenwood v. Delphi Auto. Sys., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1074 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (applying
Ohio law).
51. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 56.
52. Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (W.D.N.C.
2002) (applying North Carolina law); Robel, 59 P.3d at 620 (holding that conduct considered
merely “rough” by appellate court could be construed as outrageous and severe by supreme court);
Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App. 2003).
53. Jackson, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
54. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
119
missed from her position, but the court ruled that “[w]hile such actions
may seem ‘intemperate,’ they do not rise to the level of extreme and out-
rageous conduct, as these terms have been defined by the courts.”
55
In
declaring that liability does not extend to such “trivialities,” the Re-
statement explains that “[t]he rough edges of our society are still in need
of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must neces-
sarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate
and unkind . . . .”
56
The Restatement further states that “[t]here must still
be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety value
must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam.”
57
Similarly, Prosser and Keeton declare that there is “virtually
unanimous agreement” for neither imposing liability nor affording a
remedy in cases involving “mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even
threats,” without circumstances of aggravation.
58
“Liability of course
cannot be extended to every trivial indignity. . . .”
59
Furthermore, “[t]he plaintiff must necessarily be expected and re-
quired to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.”
60
The seminal issue as to
whether the defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged
pursuant to an objective, reasonable person standard based on all the
facts and circumstances of the case.
61
Moreover, conduct which is tortious, illegal or prompted by an
unlawful or malicious motive does not in and of itself rise to the level of
“extreme and outrageous” for the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
62
Even if motive or intent is deemed to be criminal, “pu-
55. Id.
56. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. d (1965).
57. Id.
58. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 59.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New Jersey law
and the “reasonable jury” standard); Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D.
Utah 2002); Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (apply-
ing a reasonable person standard); Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct.
2003) (applying the “average member of the community” test); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d
611, 620 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the “reasonable minds” test was met as to outrage and sever-
ity).
62. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. d. (1965); see also Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218
F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002) (“Even if defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff was
driven by an unlawful motive such as plaintiff’s race, defendant’s conduct is not so extreme and
120
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[Vol. 21:1
nitive” or a “personal vendetta,” that frame of mind has been deemed in-
sufficient for tort liability.
63
For example, in Texas Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sears,
64
the at will plaintiff employee, an independent
insurance agent, was discharged after he “blew the whistle” on a local
adjuster and other agents he claimed were part of a kickback scheme.
65
The defendant insurance agency had hired a private investigator to in-
vestigate the kickback scheme, and although the investigator uncovered
no direct evidence that the plaintiff was involved, he still pointed to two
“suspicious dealings” and branded the plaintiff as a suspect.
66
Conse-
quently, the defendant company fired the plaintiff, attempted to get the
plaintiff’s insurance license revoked, and alerted several federal and
state government agencies as to the kickback scheme, to the kickback
scheme.
67
In denying tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the Texas Supreme Court emphasized that wrongful conduct
must be “extreme and outrageous”
68
and “[a]ccordingly, any punitive in-
tent or personal vendetta underlying [defendant’s] post-termination acts
will not, standing alone, support an extreme and outrageous finding.”
69
The court further explained that “[t]he only evidence about [defendant’s]
interpretation of the investigation’s findings is that it had a reasonable
belief that [plaintiff] was involved in very suspicious dealings . . . .”
70
The defendant’s action to make the authorities aware of its allegedly
negligent investigation or its attempt to insure that any suspected illegal
payments were reported to the Internal Revenue Service was not found
to be extreme and outrageous conduct.
71
In some jurisdictions, the scope of what is considered extreme and
outrageous conduct has been narrowed considerably in light of discre-
tion reserved for employers. Texas courts have held that in an employ-
outrageous as those terms are construed by Kansas courts for purposes of assessing the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.”); Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 792, 795 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (holding that the fact that plaintiff’s discharge was suffi-
cient for wrongful discharge claim pursuant to public policy doctrine was insufficient alone to prove
the tort of emotional distress tort); Rigby v. Fallsway Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d 1056, 1064–65 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex. 1999).
63. Rigby, 779 N.E.2d at 1064; Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604,
612 (Tex. 2002).
64. 84 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2002).
65. Id. at 606.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 606–07.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. at 612.
70. Id.
71. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
121
ment dispute case, extreme and outrageous conduct “exists only in the
most unusual circumstances.”
72
As one Texas appellate court further
elaborated, “[i]n the workplace, even though the employer’s conduct
might be unpleasant for the employee, the employer has the discretion to
supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline its work-
ers.”
73
Moreover, if a workplace dispute is deemed to be an “ordinary
employment dispute,” it will be exceedingly difficult for an employee to
sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress lawsuit.
74
For ex-
ample, the Texas Supreme Court found that a defendant insurance com-
pany’s “conduct was within the bounds of its discretion to supervise, re-
view, discipline, and ultimately terminate, its independent agents in light
of allegations regarding an ongoing kickback scheme.”
75
The court fur-
ther reasoned that even if the company’s conduct may have seemed “in-
sensitive, stressful, or even unnecessary,” they should be granted “some
latitude to discover and eliminate alleged insurance fraud and employee
misconduct.”
76
In Williams v. First Tennessee National Corp.,
77
the defendant em-
ployer terminated the plaintiff after questioning the plaintiff in front of
two other employees about the plaintiff’s use of the company credit
card.
78
As the plaintiff was being escorted out of the building, one of the
plaintiff’s co-workers told the plaintiff in front of other employees that
the plaintiff had been terminated and would not be rehired.
79
The court
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on summary judgment,
terming the matter an “ordinary employment dispute,” and ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden on the “extreme and outrageous
conduct” requirement.
80
72. Id. at 611; see also Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D.
Tex. 2002) (“Incidents in which a Texas court has determined the conduct of an employer with re-
gard to an employee to be extreme and outrageous are few.”); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998
S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. 1999); Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App.
2003) (“Only in the most unusual circumstances does an employer’s conduct rise to that level.”).
73. Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 805.
74. Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (stating investigation, reclassification, and demotion of an
employee deemed to be an “ordinary employment dispute” and thus did not rise to level of extreme
and outrageous conduct); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 611; Williams, 97 S.W.3d
at 805.
75. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 606, 611.
76. Id. at 612.
77. 97 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App. 2003).
78. Id. at 802.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 805.
122
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[Vol. 21:1
According to the Texas Supreme Court, in order “to establish a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
workplace, an employee must prove the existence of some conduct that
brings the dispute outside the scope of an ordinary employment dispute
and into the realm of extreme and outrageous conduct.”
81
Despite this
heavy burden, there are employment scenarios where the egregiousness
of the conduct was sufficient for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress liability.
82
In GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, the Texas Supreme
Court found that while employers have broad discretion in how they su-
pervise and discipline employees, “terrorizing them is simply not ac-
ceptable.”
83
The court in turn ruled that an employer who is unhappy
with an employee’s performance can terminate them, discipline them, or
take some approach to the problem that is more appropriate than “foster-
ing . . . abuse, humiliation, and intimidation . . . .”
84
There are many cases that clearly illustrate the difficulty of demon-
strating extreme and outrageous conduct in an employment setting.
85
For
example, four incidents of work-related yelling, even if laced with pro-
fanity directed at the employee, did not “approach the ‘extreme and out-
rageous’ conduct required to prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”
86
Ordinarily, a workplace investigation, such as the question-
ing of an employee about a wrongdoing, is insufficient to support a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
87
Demoting an em-
ployee in part for poor attendance, even though similarly situated em-
ployees with similar or worse attendance records were not demoted, is
not outrageous enough to meet the legal outrage standard.
88
Similarly,
81. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. 1999).
82. Id. at 616–17 (holding that supervisor’s conduct was extreme and outrageous where su-
pervisor regularly threatened, intimidated, and assaulted employees, creating a “den of terror” by
means of a pattern of ongoing harassment and abuse); see also Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84
S.W.3d at 611 (citing the GTE Southwest decision favorably).
83. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 617.
84. Id.
85. Duffy, supra note 12, at 402 (“Despite the expansive view of the tort exemplified by these
earlier cases, courts in a number of jurisdictions subsequently have held that adverse treatment by
an employer was not outrageous.”).
86. Higgins v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 2003).
87. Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (noting
that the investigation, reclassification, and demotion of employee was not actionable as intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Abeles v. Mellon Bank Corp., 747 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (discussing how plaintiff was questioned about forgeries of her supervisor’s signature);
Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 611 (citing Randall’s Food Mkt., Inc. v. Johnson,
891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995) (noting “severe” questioning of employee is insufficient)).
88. Bush v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780, 800–01 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
123
criticizing an employee’s work three times and calling the employee a
“nothing” and a “nobody” was not “extreme and outrageous” behavior
as a matter of law.
89
Demoting and then temporarily reassigning an em-
ployee to another position is not extreme and outrageous conduct.
90
An
increased workload and heightened scrutiny of an employee was not suf-
ficiently outrageous, even if it culminated in the constructive discharge
of the employee.
91
Allegations that a co-worker “frequently and unnec-
essarily” interrupted the employee as she worked, “falsely maligned” the
plaintiff’s work performance, and made inappropriate comments to the
plaintiff about her clothing and the defendant’s feelings toward the
plaintiff did not demonstrate conduct sufficiently outrageous and ex-
treme to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
92
Investigating, verbally reprimanding, and then discharging an em-
ployee for violating a firm’s disciplinary policy, which forbids fighting
or attempting bodily harm, has also been deemed inadequate.
93
Termi-
nating an employee after an investigation, and then escorting the termi-
nated employee off the premises will also be insufficient for a claim of
intentional infliction tort liability.
94
Terminating an employee, while
treating other similarly situated employees differently because of their
race, has been held to be insufficiently outrageous.
95
Not renewing the
contract of an employee because of unverified or unfounded complaints
of “inappropriate contact” with young male campers, was deemed “of-
fensive” by the First Circuit,
96
but not “outrageous” because “[t]he stan-
dard for making a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
very high.”
97
Furthermore, striking an employee on the leg with a cane
for not doing a task promptly, and then firing that employee, has not
been deemed to be sufficiently outrageous for liability.
98
The wrongful
89. Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
90. Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
91. Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2002).
92. Zephir v. Inemer, 757 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
93. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1255, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
94. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 611 (Tex. 2002) (citing Wor-
nick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993); Abeles v. Mellon Bank Corp., 747 N.Y.S.2d
372, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
95. Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002).
96. Moss v. Camp Pemigewassett, Inc., 312 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 511.
98. Thomas Hyll Funeral Home v. Bradford, 233 F. Supp. 2d 704, 714 (D.V.I. 2002).
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and bad faith refusal to pay or the termination of workers’ compensation
benefits was also deemed insufficiently outrageous.
99
In Carnemolla v. Walsh,
100
the defendant firm’s accountant sug-
gested a scheme whereby the employee would list more hours on her
timesheet than she actually worked in order to defray the costs of in-
creased health care insurance premiums.
101
The plaintiff claimed that the
owner of the firm was aware of the arrangement and that she was as-
sured by the accountant that she was not misappropriating funds.
102
However, when the owner of the firm presumably discovered the dis-
crepancies in the plaintiff’s time card, he accused her of embezzlement,
threatened criminal action and forced her to resign.
103
The plaintiff sued
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the state appellate
court, although noting that the “conduct alleged in this case may have
been distressful or hurtful to the plaintiff,” agreed with the trial judge
that as a matter of law it was not sufficiently outrageous or extreme to
withstand dismissal on summary judgment.
104
In Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp.,
105
the plaintiff argued that his com-
pany’s conduct was extreme and outrageous because it fired him after
thirty-two years of service without giving him an opportunity to “save
face,” and that people might infer he was terminated for misconduct or
that he was “deadwood.”
106
Furthermore, the plaintiff also argued that
the company incorrectly stated that he “elected” early retirement.
107
The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the Idaho Supreme
Court required “very extreme conduct” before finding intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress from discharge.
108
Finally, termination of an employee with eight years of service,
who recently returned to work from being hospitalized with assurance
that he would be “taken care of,” was not deemed to be sufficiently ex-
treme and outrageous conduct, even though the employer’s representa-
tives taped the termination notice on the door to his home when the em-
ployee’s wife was present.
109
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also
99. Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d 832, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
100. 815 A.2d 1251 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
101. Id. at 1254.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1261.
105. 329 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. Id. at 750.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. EEOC v. Voss Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1356, 1357, 1362, 1363 (W.D. Okla.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
125
noted that even a constructive discharge in and of itself will be insuffi-
cient for a finding of “extreme and outrageous conduct.”
110
The court
explained its reasoning, stating that it is not unusual for an employer to
constructively discharge an employee by creating unpleasant and oner-
ous working conditions effectuated to force the employee to quit, but
such behavior does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
111
Nevertheless, there are “outrage” employment cases where the em-
ployee has prevailed, at least in some stage in the legal proceedings.
112
For example, conducting a “sham investigation” for the “sole purpose of
retaliating” against a whistleblowing employee was deemed to be suffi-
ciently extreme and outrageous for one state appellate court.
113
In an-
other state appellate case, a “whistleblowing” employee claimed that she
was fired for refusing to participate in what she alleged was a RICO
“real estate transaction closing mill” run by her employer.
114
The plain-
tiff asserted that her employer’s conduct was sufficiently outrageous and
extreme to state a valid claim, but her suit was dismissed by the trial
court.
115
The appellate court reversed in part stating that “it is possible
that [plaintiff] would be entitled to recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.”
116
In yet another case, a plaintiff, who had hurt her
back and was given a light-duty assignment was stared at, ridiculed,
mocked, laughed at, yelled at, and mimicked because of her disability by
her co-workers.
117
These co-workers called the plaintiff the most vulgar
sexual names and also told customers that the plaintiff had lied about her
back injury.
118
Although the state appellate court deemed the conduct to
be merely “insulting” and “rough,” the Washington Supreme Court dis-
agreed and branded the conduct outrageous and severe, and thus action-
able as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
119
2003).
110. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991).
111. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620 (Wash. 2002). But see Duffy, supra note 12, at
389 (“Until recently, there was no question that a supervisor who gave an employee a less than sat-
isfactory evaluation, or who criticized the employee’s work, was free from liability for this action,
provided the supervisor had not discriminated in violation of a statutory mandate.”).
112. Duffy, supra note 12, at 400 (“Some courts have gone to great lengths to stretch the con-
cept of outrageousness to provide relief to employees who were treated in ways the court found dis-
tasteful, unfair, or in bad faith.”).
113. Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
114. Nicholson v. Windham, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
115. Id. at 468, 470.
116. Id. at 470.
117. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 614 (Wash. 2002).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 620.
126
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In Rigby v. Fallsway Equipment Co.,
120
the employee incurred a se-
vere head injury while at work, but was eventually authorized to return
to work to perform light duties.
121
However, when he did not return to
work, the plaintiff’s employer sent several letters to him requesting that
he return to work and informing him that his continued wages in lieu of
worker’s compensation benefits would expire.
122
When the plaintiff did
not return to work, he was terminated.
123
During the course of ascertain-
ing whether and when the plaintiff was ready to return to work, the de-
fendant employer made several inquiries to the plaintiff’s health-care
providers, who stated that they did not feel harassed by the employer’s
actions.
124
However, the plaintiff’s emotional distress claim was not lim-
ited, as the state appellate court underscored, to the defendant em-
ployer’s contacts with the health-care providers.
125
The plaintiff’s com-
plaint was also based on the fact that the defendant employer allegedly
had contacted the plaintiff and his wife at home.
126
Such an allegation
was sufficient to preclude the dismissal of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim on the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment.
127
In Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co.,
128
the court went to great lengths
to characterize the situation as way beyond the typical ordinary em-
ployment dispute or constructive discharge situation.
129
The employee,
in this case was an executive vice-president with a college education and
thirty years experience, but was stripped of his duties and demoted to an
entry level warehouse supervisor, and given the most menial and de-
meaning duties, including janitorial and cleaning duties.
130
At trial the
jury determined that the employer was “unwilling to fire [plaintiff] out-
right, intentionally and systematically set out to humiliate him in the
hopes he would quit,” and accordingly found in favor of the plaintiff on
the outrage claim.
131
The Fifth Circuit agreed, condemning the em-
ployer’s conduct as “degrading and humiliating,” “intentional and mean
120. 779 N.E.2d 1056 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
121. Id. at 1058.
122. Id. at 1058–59.
123. Id. at 1059.
124. Id. at 1063.
125. Id. at 1066.
126. Id.
127. Id. 1065–66.
128. 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991).
129. Id. at 1145.
130. Id.
131. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
127
spirited,” and “a steep downhill push to total humiliation,” and thus
came to the conclusion that the “conduct was, indeed, so outrageous that
civilized society should not tolerate it.”
132
Similarly, in LaBrier v. An-
heuser Ford, Inc.,
133
a case involving the use by the employee of an auto
dealership’s demonstrator car, the court agreed with a jury finding
that the action of the employees of [defendant company] in appearing
at plaintiff’s residence in the presence of two neighbors and in a loud
and threatening voice attempting to harass and humiliate plaintiff by
repeatedly questioning her as to the whereabouts of her husband and
the demonstrator automobile and threatening to have her husband ar-
rested by the issuance of an ‘all-points bulletin’ to the police could be
characterized as ‘extreme and outrageous.’
134
Despite the very rigorous “outrage” standard, the cases do reveal that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does have some useful-
ness to protect employees from extreme and outrageous conduct in the
workplace. The problem, of course, as the examination of the current
case law reveals, is that this key “extreme and outrageous” conduct is
not precisely defined and is extremely fact-specific. Thus, the applica-
tion of this critical legal standard varies from state to state and from
court to court.
135
This element presents an almost insurmountable hurdle
for the plaintiff to prevail at the various stages of the case.
136
132. Id.
133. 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
134. Id. at 793.
135. Duffy, supra note 12, at 409 (asserting that the definition of outrageous “depend[s] on the
descriptive powers of the judge writing the opinion”).
136. See id. at 394. Duffy sees a danger in the lack of “objective guidelines” for outrageous-
ness because “[i]t is likely that defendants will be selected based on their ability to pay damages
rather than on what they have done and fact finders may confuse outrageous acts with unpopular
ones, causing fear of tort judgments to chill socially valuable behavior.” Id. Moreover, certain cases
“properly give even the most conscientious employer pause.. . . [A]n employer would be left in a
quandary as to the circumstances under which a demotion or other change in the terms or conditions
of at will employment would subject it to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
Id. at 410.
128
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C. Intent
1. Requisite Intention
For a viable cause of action, the defendant must have intended to
inflict the emotional distress on the plaintiff; or conversely, that the de-
fendant knew or should have known to a probable or substantial cer-
tainty that emotional distress would be the likely result of the defen-
dant’s conduct.
137
As one court concisely noted, “[i]t is the intent to
harm one emotionally that constitutes the basis for the tort of an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.”
138
According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the “intent” element will be satisfied if the defendant
“desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows
that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
conduct.”
139
According to Prosser and Keeton, the “intent” requirement
is satisfied if the mental distress is inflicted by “the defendant either de-
siring to cause it or knowing that it was substantially certain to follow
from the conduct.”
140
The employer’s or co-workers’ objectionable con-
duct must be shown to have been intended or calculated to cause or
probably would cause severe emotional distress.
141
2. Recklessness v. Negligence
The reckless infliction of emotional distress shares the same legal
standards and consequences as the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
142
Therefore, acting with a deliberate disregard or a reckless in-
difference of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will en-
137. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 192, 207 (D. Conn. 2002); Bator v. Yale New
Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794; GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999).
138. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Cullison
v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991)).
139. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. i (1965).
140. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 64.
141. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991); Pavilon v. Kaferly,
561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defining intent as whether “there was a high probability
that [defendant’s] conduct would inflict severe emotional distress”); LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794.
142. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46(1) cmt. a (1965); see also Brunson v. Bayer
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 192, 207 (D. Conn. 2002); Thomas Hyll Funeral Home v. Bradford, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 704, 714 (D.V.I. 2002) (recognizing claim for “reckless infliction of emotional distress”);
LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
129
sue is sufficient to satisfy the “recklessness” standard.
143
Similarly, act-
ing in conscious or deliberate disregard that mental distress will follow
from the conduct in question, as well as acting in a willful and wanton
manner, has been held to be the equivalent of the recklessness necessary
to satisfy the tort’s intent requirement.
144
Moreover, if the defendant is
aware that the plaintiff is having emotional problems and thus is particu-
larly susceptible to emotional distress, the plaintiff will more readily be
able to establish “recklessness” and thus show causation as well as in-
tent.
145
However, even if the resulting emotional distress was severe, the
employee’s claim will be denied if the distress was negligently
caused.
146
As one federal district court noted, citing to the Restatement
and pertinent state law, “[t]here is no basis for concluding that the Con-
necticut Supreme Court intended to engraft a simple negligence standard
onto this intentional tort.”
147
Similarly, in several cases, the employer al-
legedly failed to investigate complaints and incidents of racial discrimi-
nation and/or sexual harassment as well as warn employees about the of-
fending employee.
148
However, the courts have deemed the employer’s
inaction to be merely negligent and neither intentional nor reckless, and
thus liability for emotional distress was denied.
149
Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.
150
vividly illustrates the perceived
demanding nature of the outrage standard. The plaintiff attempted to cir-
cumvent the rigors of the intentional tort by contending that her supervi-
sor’s criticisms and poor evaluations, which ultimately resulted in her
termination, were grounds for the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.
151
However, the court rejected the plaintiff’s negligence
claim, noting that “[a]n employer’s supervisory conduct is inherently
‘intentional,’” thus precluding the negligent version of the distress
tort.
152
Consequently, an employee will not be permitted to avoid the
rigors of the intentional emotional distress tort by relying on supervisory
143. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. i (1965); K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12,
at 64; see also Brunson, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 208; LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794.
144. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 64–65; see also LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794.
145. LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 794.
146. Brunson, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2002)
149. Id. at 476; Brunson, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 207–08.
150. 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
151. Id. at 584, 601.
152. Id. at 601 (citing Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1105 (1990)).
130
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conduct as the basis for a negligence tort claim, which has a relatively
lower standard.
3. Transferred Intent
Theoretically, it is possible that the common law intentional tort
doctrine of transferred intent, found principally in the assault and battery
cases, could be used to support a recovery in an intentional infliction of
emotional distress case.
153
Regarding transferred intent, Prosser and
Keeton asserts that “[t]here seems to be little reason to apply it when the
plaintiff suffers physical harm, and to reject it where there is mental
damage.”
154
Nevertheless, according to Prosser and Keeton, “rarely” has
a transferred intent “fright” case arose, even in a battery context.
155
Simi-
larly, the employment cases analyzed for this article did not reveal any
use of the transferred intent doctrine.
D. Distress
1. Actual Severe Distress
The plaintiff can assert that emotional distress was caused by the
defendant’s action; yet certainly not all emotional agitation, even if in-
tentionally inflicted, is redressed as tortious emotional distress.
156
Fur-
thermore, as the Restatement notes, “[c]omplete emotional tranquility is
seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial
emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people.”
157
Therefore, in order to be actionable the emotional distress must be in
fact severe to the reasonable person or person of ordinary sensibilities.
158
Thus, conduct by the employer or co-workers of the complaining em-
153. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 307, at 833–34.
154. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 65.
155. Id.
156. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965); K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12,
at 63; see also Leavitt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 238 F. Supp. 2d 313, 317 (D. Me. 2003) (holding
that frustration and humiliation were insufficient to satisfy the severe distress requirement); Wil-
liams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App. 2003).
157. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965).
158. Id.; D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832; see also Leavitt, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 316–17; GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618–19 (Tex. 1999); Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 805; Robel
v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
131
ployee must cause actual, severe emotional distress,
159
and not merely
some lesser, though genuine, emotional reaction such as fright, embar-
rassment, humiliation, hurt feelings, worry, anxiety, upset, irritation,
vexation, minor psychic shocks, annoyance or anger.
160
In Robel v. Roundup Corp.,
161
the plaintiff, who was given a light-
duty assignment as a result of her back injury, was stared at, ridiculed,
mocked, laughed at, yelled at, and mimicked because of her disability by
her co-workers.
162
These same co-workers told customers that the plain-
tiff had lied about her back injury, and additionally called the plaintiff
vulgar sexual names.
163
Although the appellate court, using a “reason-
able minds” standard, deemed the conduct to be merely “insulting” and
“rough,” the Washington Supreme Court disagreed, and branded the
conduct outrageous and severe, and thus actionable as intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
164
In Leavitt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
165
the employee initiated a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress because her employer did
not accommodate her disability, assigned her to an evening shift against
her expressed wishes, and did not facilitate her transfer to another facil-
ity.
166
The court, however, dismissed her claim in part due to lack of se-
vere emotional distress.
167
The court took note of precedent which held
that the “severe” requirement “means something more than minor and
psychic and emotional shocks, something more than the usual and insig-
nificant emotional traumas of daily life in modern society.”
168
Conse-
quently, although noting that the employer’s conduct frustrated the em-
ployee and caused her to feel humiliated, the court ruled that “the
distress [did] not rise beyond the usual emotional traumas of daily life in
a modern society.”
169
159. Nicholson v. Windham, 571 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561
N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 618–19; Williams, 97
S.W.3d at 804–05; Robel, 59 P.3d at 619–20.
160. Leavitt, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 317; Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1151
(Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
161. 59 P.3d 611 (Wash. 2002).
162. Id. at 614.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 620.
165. 238 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D. Me. 2003).
166. Id. at 315–16.
167. Id. at 317.
168. Id.
169. Id.
132
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[Vol. 21:1
Finally, in Williams v. Tennessee National Corp.,
170
the employee
was questioned in front of other employees about his personal use of the
company’s credit card.
171
Plaintiff was however allowed to retrieve his
belongings, but was then escorted off the premises into a “bull pen area,”
where a co-worker told him in front of other employees that he was be-
ing terminated and would not be eligible for rehire.
172
The record indi-
cated that the plaintiff had experienced “general feelings of anxiety” in
accepting a position with the company, and when he was terminated, he
“sat there in a daze and in shock for awhile.”
173
The plaintiff also indi-
cated that being escorted out of the building was “kind of all a blur,” and
that he was “emotionally reeling from being fired.”
174
Moreover, the re-
cord also indicated that he was “cranky” and “despondent” after his ter-
mination and lost his appetite, but that he was able to “‘bounce back,’”
was in a good state of mental health, never took any sick time from other
work and did not seek medical or psychiatric advice.
175
The court first
pointed out the applicable legal standard of “severe emotional distress,”
which “means that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it
without undergoing unreasonable suffering.”
176
The court also noted that
“[t]he plaintiff must show more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, em-
barrassment, or anger.”
177
Consequently, the court ruled that “[t]he facts
here . . . [did] not demonstrate ‘severe’ emotional distress because they
[did] not rise to the level of emotional distress such that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it without undergoing unreasonable
suffering.”
178
Yet in another case, constructive discharge conduct that
was deemed to be intentional, mean spirited, systematic, degrading, and
demeaning was more than sufficient for the court to affirm a jury finding
of severe distress, particularly when the distress was so severe it “re-
sulted in institutional confinement and treatment for someone with no
history of mental problems.”
179
The fact that the alleged outrageous conduct giving rise to the dis-
tress is deemed to be merely trivial, indignant, insulting, or annoying re-
veals the lack of “any convincing assurance that the asserted mental dis-
170. 97 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App. 2003).
171. Id. at 805.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
133
tress is genuine, or that if genuine it is serious and reasonable.”
180
How-
ever, the fact that the mental distress is evidenced by “physical illness of
a serious character” is an important factor in allowing recovery.
181
Yet,
according to Prosser and Keeton, “there are numerous decisions which
have found liability for mere mental disturbance without any evidence of
physical consequences.”
182
Similarly, Dobbs relates that “medical testi-
mony is not ordinarily required to demonstrate either the severity of the
distress or its cause.”
183
Of course, the fact that the aggrieved employee
is seeking medical, psychiatric, or psychological care is evidence of the
presence and genuineness of severe distress.
184
Such care is not alone
controlling on the “severity” issue
185
or “outrage” issue.
186
The fact that
the misconduct by the defendant was so extreme and outrageous should
180. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 59.
181. Id. at 64; see also Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1141 (stating that employee with no history of men-
tal illness was hospitalized with a psychotic manic episode); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d
216, 217–18 (Cal. 1970) (permitting the case to go to the jury because the employee was ill for sev-
eral weeks, unable to work, and sustained shock, nausea, and insomnia, in permitting case to go to
jury); Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (pointing
out that plaintiff “suffered physical manifestations of the distress”); Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920
S.W.2d 61, 66 (Ky. 1996) (considering that the employee “experienced real and disabling depres-
sion”); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618–19 (Tex. 1999) (noting that employees
victimized by supervisor experienced “nausea, stomach disorders, headaches, difficulty in sleeping
and eating, stress, anxiety and depression”).
182. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 64.
183. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832.
184. Ford v. GMC, 305 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that the fact that employee
needed “counseling or other treatment” would be evidence that emotional distress was severe);
Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 66 (noting that employee’s psychotherapist recommended that plaintiff be
placed on total disability); compare Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’1 Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex.
App. 2003) (pointing out that the employee “never sought psychiatric or medical help as a result of
his termination”) with Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145 (upholding the jury’s finding of severity, the court
emphasized that distress caused to employee was so severe it resulted in institutional confinement
and treatment); Graham, 742 N.E.2d at 869 (stating that the plaintiff saw a therapist as well as a
dermatologist for stress-related acne); GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 617 (noting that “[e]ach
employee sought medical treatment for these problems, and all three plaintiffs were prescribed
medication to alleviate the problems”), and Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (stating that the plaintiff was being treated by a psychotherapist and that “the duration of this
continuing therapy provide[d] added support for the severity of the distress”).
185. EEOC v. Voss Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1363 (W.D. Okla. 2003) (holding that the
level of distress suffered by plaintiff, which was produced by the defendant’s termination actions,
caused a recurrence of medical malady and hospitalization that was insufficient to meet the “sever-
ity” requirement); Bush v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780, 801 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (not-
ing that the fact that the plaintiff continued seeing a psychologist did not create “genuine issues of
material fact” with respect to the severity of the emotional distress).
186. Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260–61 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that re-
ceiving medical treatment and counseling for conduct that “may have been distressful or hurtful”
was not sufficient to support a finding of “extreme or outrageous” conduct).
134
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help the plaintiff establish the presence of severe emotional distress, as
such emotional harm might be construed as a logical or reasonable infer-
ence due to the severity of the misconduct.
187
Of course, having an ex-
pert witness testify as to the severity of the resulting distress helps.
188
The more “sufficiently pleaded detailed facts” the plaintiff introduces to
show resulting distress, the more likely the plaintiff will be able to estab-
lish that the defendant’s conduct actually caused severe emotional dis-
tress.
189
2. Reasonableness of Aggrieved Party’s Distress
Closely related, but not identical, to the actual severe distress ne-
cessity is the reasonableness requirement. The plaintiff may be able to
establish with relative ease that emotional distress, or even severe dis-
tress, was produced. Yet, even if the distress caused was severe, the
plaintiff also must demonstrate that his or her actual, severe distress was
in fact reasonable.
190
Typically, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable
person, confronted with the same or similar circumstances, would have
at least suffered the same distress as suffered by the plaintiff.
191
Thus,
the employee must show that the distress suffered was more than a rea-
sonable employee could be expected to endure in the workplace without
undergoing unreasonable suffering.
192
In Bator v. Yale New Haven Hos-
pital,
193
the court noted that “the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the ac-
tor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
194
In that case, the plaintiff,
a respiratory therapist, was recommended for discipline by his supervi-
sor for not reporting for duty.
195
The plaintiff was also allegedly paid
187. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 618–19 (stating that the employer’s outrageous con-
duct was “legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the employees suffered severe emo-
tional distress”); Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1252 (noting that the jury was permitted to make a reason-
able inference from the evidence).
188. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 618–19 (finding that expert witness testimony sup-
ported the employee’s contentions that they suffered from severe emotional distress).
189. Graham, 742 N.E.2d at 869.
190. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 63 (applying “reasonable person ‘of ordinary sensi-
bilities’” test); D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832 (applying reasonable person test); see also Briggs
v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002); Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 805.
191. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832; see also Briggs, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
192. Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 805; Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D.
Utah 2002); Briggs, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
193. 808 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)
194. Id. at 1151.
195. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
135
less than other less qualified employees, was falsely accused by a super-
visor of endangering a patient’s life, and was told to seek psychiatric
help after he complained to another supervisor about his schedule and
assignments.
196
Furthermore, the employer also recommended that the
plaintiff enroll in anger management classes after the plaintiff had a con-
frontation with a nurse.
197
The court, however, held that the facts, taken
together or in isolation, neither satisfied the “reasonableness” nor “out-
rageous” standard.
198
The Restatement similarly declares that the circumstances must be
such that “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the com-
munity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
199
According to Prosser and Keeton, when the
underlying conduct is deemed merely trivial, annoying, insulting or in-
dignant, the genuineness, seriousness and reasonableness of the claimed
distress becomes questionable.
200
Proving the requisite level of unreasonableness also may emerge as
a difficult task for the plaintiff in the employment context. For example,
in Johnston v. Davis Securities, Inc.,
201
the plaintiff’s former employer
called her new employer, stated that plaintiff was suing the former em-
ployer, related that plaintiff was improperly collecting workers’ com-
pensation benefits when she was not, and that the former employer was
going to call the new employer’s corporate headquarters and tell them
that plaintiff was suing the former employer for back wages.
202
The
plaintiff then brought an emotional distress claim against her former em-
ployer, but it was dismissed as a matter of law because the level of con-
duct would not have been sufficiently outrageous to a reasonable person
pursuant to state law.
203
The case law therefore shows that if the em-
ployee asserts a particular sensitivity or susceptibility, then the employee
will be required to demonstrate that the distress was reasonably based on
that special vulnerability.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1151.
199. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. d (1965).
200. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 59, 63.
201. 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Utah 2002).
202. Id. at 1232.
203. Id.
136
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3. Physical or Bodily Harm or Impact
As opposed to claims for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the courts as well as the Restatement have uniformly rejected a
physical impact or bodily harm requirement in cases where the plaintiff
demonstrates either the intent to cause emotional distress or reckless dis-
regard for the likelihood the defendant’s conduct will produce such dis-
tress.
204
Pennsylvania, however, has an interesting approach to the
physical harm requirement. Pennsylvania courts have held that physical
harm must accompany the emotional harm, but that physical harm is
deemed to include continued mental and emotional harm.
205
According
to Dobbs, “most of the cases” do not “require proof of physical symp-
toms . . . much less proof of physical harm or impact.”
206
Consequently,
the employee should not be required to demonstrate that he or she suf-
fered a physical impact or harm in order to sustain a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as the mental harm would be regarded as
the equivalent of the physical injury.
207
The rationale is that when the
plaintiff has evidence of severe distress, then the plaintiff is not required
to show evidence of other physical harm.
208
Of course, actual severe dis-
tress is easier to prove with evidence of objective manifestations of
physical harm stemming from the emotional distress, such as shock, ill-
ness or other bodily harm.
209
In the absence of bodily harm, however, the
Restatement counsels that the courts may consider “outrage as a guaran-
tee that the claim is genuine; but if the enormity of the outrage carries
conviction that there has in fact been severe emotional distress, bodily
harm is not required.”
210
Dobbs concurs with the Restatement view by
204. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. k (1965); see also Agis v. Howard Johnson
Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 318–19 (Mass. 1976).
205. McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702–03 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
see also Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 486 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970) (stating that physical injury
was required, but “[t]he physical consequences of shock or other disturbance to the nervous system
are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that plaintiff has suffered physical injury from defendant’s
conduct”).
206. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832.
207. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 56 (“[M]edical science has recognized long since
that not only fright and shock, but also grief, anxiety, rage and shame, are in themselves ‘physical’
injuries, in the sense that they produce well marked changes in the body, and symptoms that are
readily visible to the professional eye.”).
208. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 303, at 826.
209. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. k (1965); see also Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 217–
18.
210. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. k (1965).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
137
emphasizing that “[w]hen the defendant’s conduct is extreme enough,
that fact tends to prove severe distress.”
211
4. Intensity and Duration of Distress: Single or Isolated Acts
v. Regularity or Patterns of Distress
In evaluating the plaintiff’s infliction of emotional distress cause of
action, the courts will assess not only the outrageousness of the defen-
dant’s conduct, but will also weigh the cumulative effect of any alleg-
edly repeated, regular and ongoing objectionable behavior.
212
As the
Texas Supreme Court noted, “[w]e agree with the overwhelming weight
of authority in this state and around the country that when repeated or
ongoing severe harassment is shown, the conduct should be evaluated as
a whole in determining whether it is extreme and outrageous.”
213
This
“totality of the circumstances” rule has the practical consequence of
lessening the severity of the “extreme outrage” standard from the em-
ployee’s vantage point, especially if the repeated objectionable conduct
is inflicted by the employee’s manager or supervisor.
214
Accordingly, the
courts have found that conduct, standing alone or as an isolated incident,
could not be considered sufficiently “extreme” or “outrageous,” but
could rise to the tortious level when the actions are repeated, longer in
duration, or form part of a larger, regular pattern of offensive behav-
ior.
215
For instance, in GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce,
216
a supervisor, who
was a former United States Army supply sergeant, regularly yelled,
screamed and cursed at the employees in a flagrantly obscene and vulgar
manner.
217
The supervisor also repeatedly lunged and charged at the em-
ployees with his head down, and was also reported to have called the
211. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832.
212. Id. at 827 (noting that “repeating or continuing acts” are one of “four markers of out-
rage”); see also Wait v. Beck’s N. Am., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 172, 181 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); McClease
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561
N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 617 (Tex.
1999); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 406 (Tex. App. 2002).
213. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 616.
214. McClease, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 698, 703 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on plaintiff’s allegations of “unceasing far-
rago of racial epithets,” discriminatory actions against a black employee, and collusion with another
manager to terminate plaintiff and other black employees); see also Jackson, 84 S.W.3d at 406 (not-
ing the Supreme Court of Texas may find liability for those in a position of power).
215. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 617.
216. 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
217. Id. at 613–14.
138
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employees into his office everyday to make them stand in front of him
while he simply stared at them.
218
In upholding the jury’s finding that the
supervisor intentionally inflicted emotional distress and that the em-
ployer was therefore vicariously liable, the Texas Supreme Court under-
scored the “pattern” of abuse factor, stating:
[b]eing purposefully humiliated and intimidated, and being repeatedly
put in fear of one’s physical well-being at the hands of a supervisor is
more than a mere triviality or annoyance. Occasional malicious and
abusive incidents should not be condoned, but must often be tolerated
in society. But once the conduct such as that shown here becomes a
regular pattern of behavior and continues despite the victim’s objection
and attempts to remedy the situation, it can no longer be tolerated. It is
the severity and regularity of [a supervisor’s] abusive and threatening
conduct that brings his behavior into the realm of extreme and outra-
geous conduct.
219
If, however, one particular act of the defendant is so flagrantly extreme
and outrageous, this single egregious incident may be adequate grounds
for the tort.
220
Yet the plaintiff will have a much stronger case if he or
she can show a pattern of intentional wrongful behavior, since the outra-
geousness of the distressing conduct and the plaintiff’s subsequent se-
vere emotional reaction will be easier to establish.
221
5. Particularly Sensitive or Susceptible Plaintiffs
An important factor in assessing the outrageousness of the defen-
dant’s conduct as well as the plaintiff’s resulting emotional reaction, is
the particular vulnerability of the plaintiff. As one recalls from their first
year of law school, a long-established maxim of the common law of torts
is that “the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.”
222
Conse-
quently, in the case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
218. Id.
219. Id. at 617.
220. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965) (noting that “intensity” of distress
is a factor in determining “severity”); see also Bleeke, supra note 17, at 366 (discussing “single in-
cident” employment cases).
221. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965) (noting that “duration” of distress
is a factor in determining “severity”); see also GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 617.
222. See D
AN
B. D
OBBS
& P
AUL
T. H
AYDEN
, T
ORTS AND
C
OMPENSATION
: P
ERSONAL
A
CCOUNTABILITY AND
S
OCIAL
R
ESPONSIBILITY
F
OR
I
NJURY
231 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining the
proposition that the defendant is liable for the extra damages the plaintiff suffers due to a fragile
psyche).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
139
courts will allow the employee to demonstrate that he or she possesses
an “eggshell psyche” or is in a “fragile state.”
223
That is, the plaintiff can
show that he or she is particularly sensitive or peculiarly susceptible or
vulnerable, due to a physical or mental condition, to the distress inflicted
by the defendant under the facts of the case presented, even though the
acts complained of ordinarily would not necessarily rise to the tortious
level.
224
The fact that a plaintiff was particularly or peculiarly sensitive
to or susceptible to emotional distress may emerge as an important factor
in substantiating the plaintiff’s case, especially in a discharge situa-
tion.
225
For example, in Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc.,
226
the plaintiff, a
former employee, was deemed to be in a “fragile state” when she was
terminated.
227
The plaintiff was also said to be “extremely anxious,
stressed, and sleep-deprived” in the same month as her termination.
228
Within this same time period, the defendant employer’s supervisor
threatened the roommate of the plaintiff with termination unless she
evicted the plaintiff, which she subsequently did, thereby forcing the
plaintiff to find a new home.
229
The court held that there was enough
evidence for the jury to assess damages as an issue of fact.
230
In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,
231
the plaintiff, an African-
American truck driver, was fired after questioning his supervisor about
another employee driving a particular truck.
232
The court noted that the
discharge was “without just cause or provocation,” and included humili-
223. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 313, at 851–52 (explaining that a defendant is liable for actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff, even if they exceed those damages that would have been suffered
by a normally constituted person).
224. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46, cmt. f (1965); D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at
827; K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 62; see also Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742
N.E.2d 858, 867 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (noting that defendant’s representatives knew that plaintiff was “a highly emotional and
easily distraught individual who had suffered severe emotional problems before this episode that
had caused her to be hospitalized”).
225. See Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 67 (Ky. 1996) (holding that the “jury was
justified in concluding that despite this knowledge of susceptibility, or perhaps because of it, [em-
ployer] continued its course of conduct calculated to exert more pressure on [employee] in order to
make him acquiesce to [employer’s] demand of signing the release papers”); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 (Cal. 1970) (involving the discharge of employee “without just cause
or provocation,” including humiliating and racially insulting language and conduct).
226. 84 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App. 2002).
227. Id. at 408.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 408–09.
230. Id.
231. 216 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970).
232. Id. at 217.
140
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ating and racially insulting language and conduct on the part of the su-
pervisor.
233
The court specifically pointed to the fact that the supervisor
was aware of the employee’s “particular susceptibility” to emotional dis-
tress as an “outrage” factor in permitting the case to go to the jury.
234
What makes the case interesting, however, is that the California Su-
preme Court noted the plaintiff’s allegation that “[n]egroes such as
plaintiff are particularly susceptible to emotional and physical distress
from conduct such as committed by the defendants.”
235
One commentator has emphasized that in the context of the termi-
nation of an at will employee, this susceptibility factor judicially “should
be given more emphasis in light of the employer’s knowledge that the
employee already has sustained the emotional trauma of a discharge.”
236
It is important to note, however, that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
adds a knowledge requirement to this “susceptibility” rule; that is, the
defendant must have possessed knowledge that the plaintiff was pecu-
liarly susceptible to the distress.
237
Yet, even in those jurisdictions that
do not require prior knowledge of susceptibility, if the defendant is
aware of the plaintiff’s special vulnerability, then the susceptibility fac-
tor should loom even larger in the outrageousness and severity analy-
sis.
238
As one court emphasized, “[c]onduct which might not ordinarily
be actionable may be considered outrageous if the defendant knows that
a plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress.”
239
How-
ever, the Restatement warns that “major outrage is essential to the tort;
and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the con-
duct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.”
240
233. Id. at 219.
234. Id. at 218–19.
235. Id. at 217–18.
236. Bleeke, supra note 17, at 372.
237. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. f, j (1965).
238. Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“This [outrageous] char-
acterization of [defendant’s harassing] conduct throughout this time period is further supported by
the fact that it was directed at a person whom he clearly knew to be susceptible to emotional dis-
tress.”).
239. Id. (noting defendant knew that plaintiff was undergoing emotional distress treatment by a
psychotherapist).
240. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. f (1965).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
141
6. Abuse of Relation or Position v. Assertion of Legal Rights
or Legitimate Interest
The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct necessary to es-
tablish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
can arise from the abuse of a position or from a relationship with the ag-
grieved party that affords the actor actual or apparent authority over the
aggrieved party.
241
As one court has noted, “the more power and control
that a defendant has over a plaintiff, the more likely defendant’s conduct
should be deemed to be outrageous” and the plaintiff’s emotional reac-
tion to be deemed severe.
242
Furthermore, according to one commenta-
tor, “[s]ome courts have seized upon this [abuse of position factor] as a
basis for applying the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the employment context, reasoning that the imbalance in bargaining
power between employer and employee requires application of the
tort.”
243
In the private employment sector, particularly when the offending
party is the plaintiff’s supervisor or manager, the outrageousness of the
actions and the severity of the emotional response may be exacer-
bated.
244
According to Dobbs, “[e]mployers may place many demands
upon employees, but the employer is not free to threaten the em-
ployee . . . .”
245
When one is in a position of power, “the abuse itself may
show that the conduct is outrageous.”
246
In Robel v. Roundup Corp.,
247
the court noted that the relationship between the parties, especially if the
wrongdoer is in a position of authority, provides an “added impetus” to
an outrage claim.
248
The plaintiff in Robel was recovering from an injury
241. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. e (1965); D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at
827 (defining one of the “four markers of outrage” as “abusing . . . power or position . . . by using a
position of dominance”); K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 61.
242. Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 866–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
243. Duffy, supra note 12, at 397.
244. McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(noting racial comments and racial epithets made by black employee’s managers); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218–19 (Cal. 1970) (finding discharge by foreman/superintendent “with-
out just cause or provocation” and with humiliating and racially insulting language and conduct,
exacerbated the response because defendant was “in a position or relation of authority over plain-
tiff”).
245. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at 828 (noting that “repeating or continuing acts” are one of
the “four markers of outrage”).
246. Id.
247. 59 P.3d 611 (Wash. 2002).
248. Id. at 620.
142
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and thus given light duty.
249
As a result, the plaintiff was mocked, ridi-
culed, and yelled at, not only by her co-workers, but also by an assistant
manager.
250
The state appellate court did not deem the conduct to be suf-
ficiently outrageous or severe.
251
However, the state supreme court,
pointing specifically to the additional fact that a manager was involved
in the misconduct, ruled that the conduct was actionable as intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
252
Therefore, the abuse of the employee
by the employer or its managerial representatives, in a notoriously un-
equal employment-at-will relationship can provide the foundation for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Moreover, when the employee’s manager or supervisor threatens to
exercise his or her authority to the severe detriment of the employee, and
the supervisor is in a position to carry out such threats, the conduct can
likely be construed as outrageous; especially if the employee is coerced
into doing something he or she ordinarily would not do.
253
Nevertheless,
one state appellate court has warned that “[e]ven when a supervisor
abuses a position of power over an employee, the employer will not be
liable for mere insults, indignities, or annoyances that are not extreme or
dangerous.”
254
Therefore, the abuse of an employer’s position and its re-
lation to the employee may emerge as very important factors for the em-
ployee who is suing his or her employer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress based on supervisory or managerial misconduct. As one
commentator has emphasized, “the employee’s entire case may hinge on
a judge’s willingness to consider the immense power that the employer
holds over the employee’s livelihood and the stressful impact on the em-
ployee when the employer wields that power as a weapon of coer-
cion.”
255
In opposition to the “abuse of relationship” factor, it is also impor-
tant to consider whether the defendant reasonably believed the pursued
249. Id.
250. Id. at 614, 620.
251. Id. at 620.
252. Id. (“‘[P]laintiff’s status as an employee may entitle him to a greater degree of protection
from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger.’”) (citing
White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991)).
253. McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(alleging that managers not only made racist comments and racial epithets, but colluded to eliminate
plaintiff and other black employees from employment); Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742
N.E.2d 858, 867–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
254. Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 406 (Tex. App. 2002).
255. Bleeke, supra note 17, at 372.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
143
objective or interest was legitimate.
256
Accordingly, if the defendant em-
ployer successfully asserts legitimate legal rights or interests, the defen-
dant may not be liable for the distress produced, even if the defendant
knows that such conduct would likely cause distress to the employee.
257
The fact that the defendant employer believes the objective was legiti-
mate and merely an assertion of a legal right does not automatically
permit outrageous conduct.
258
For example, a court indicated that an in-
vestigation by the employer into workplace misconduct is typically a le-
gitimate employer objective, and thus would not be construed as extreme
and outrageous.
259
However, a “sham” investigation was deemed to be
extreme and outrageous conduct when it was instituted for the “sole pur-
pose of retaliating against” a whistle-blowing employee with safety con-
cerns.
260
The investigation included the interview of one hundred em-
ployees, the making of several defamatory statements about the
employee, including the falsification of documents, the planting of ra-
dioactive material outside a posted area and the allegation that the em-
ployee was the “leader of a gang.”
261
7. Acts or Conduct Directed at Third Persons
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when the offend-
ing
conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
256. Graham, 742 N.E.2d at 866–67; LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 396 (“In such a situation, the employer is
arguably doing nothing more than exercising his legal rights in a way permitted by the at will rule—
discharge for any reason deemed sufficient by the employer.”); Bleeke supra note 17, at 372 (dis-
cussing the assertion of the legal rights factor in the discharge of at will employees).
257. LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 793 (stating employer questioning an employee and spouse as to
whereabouts of missing property was arguably a “legitimate interest”); Trabing v. Kinko’s, Inc., 57
P.3d 1248, 1256 (Wyo. 2002) (stating employee’s discharge of at will employee was “within its
legal rights”); see also Bleeke, supra note 17, at 372 (indicating that the assertion of legal rights
factor “has led some courts to conclude that the employer could not be liable for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress unless he was also liable for wrongful discharge, since by firing the em-
ployee the employer did no more than exercise his legal rights.”).
258. Graham, 742 N.E.2d at 867; LaBrier, 612 S.W.2d at 793–94 (noting that defendant em-
ployer’s assertion of legitimate interest was superseded by it’s knowledge that the plaintiff was “a
highly emotional and easily distraught individual who had suffered severe emotional problems be-
fore this episode”); see also Bleeke, supra note 17, at 372.
259. Graham, 742 N.E.2d at 868.
260. Id.
261. Id.
144
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[Vol. 21:1
(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress re-
sults in bodily harm.
262
Consequently, the Restatement has engrafted a “bodily harm” require-
ment for non-family, third party intentional infliction situations, which is
reminiscent of the traditional “impact” rule for the tort of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.
263
The Restatement also notes that “[t]he
cases thus far decided, however, have limited such liability to plaintiffs
who were present at the time, as distinguished from those who discover
later what has occurred.”
264
As the Restatement explains, “[t]he limita-
tion may be justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line
somewhere, since the number of persons who may suffer emotional dis-
tress at the news of an assassination of the President is virtually unlim-
ited . . . .”
265
Finally, the Restatement notes that the cases in which third
party recovery has been allowed have been either by “near relatives” or
“at least close associates,”
266
though the latter arguably would encom-
pass one’s co-workers. Nonetheless, no “third party” cases were found in
the research for this article.
Prosser and Keeton also supports the proposition that recovery can
lie for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the offending
conduct is not directed at the plaintiff but at a third party.
267
The key
element, according to Prosser and Keeton, is whether the conduct di-
rected at the third party was “substantially certain” or had a “very high
degree of probability” to cause emotional distress to the plaintiff,
268
though lesser causation standards have been used.
269
Prosser and
Keeton, however, offer two cautionary comments. First, “[o]rdinarily re-
covery in such cases is limited to plaintiffs who are not only present at
the time, but are known by the defendant to be present” because such
knowledge bolsters the causation element.
270
Second, “[t]here is the fur-
ther question of whether the recovery should be limited to near relatives
262. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
263. Id.; see also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 534 (1994).
264. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. l (1965).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3, § 12 at 65–66.
268. Id. at 65.
269. Id. (stating that there was a notion of “foreseeability” and that it “could reasonably have
been anticipated”).
270. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
145
of the person attacked, or at least to close associates, where there is some
additional guarantee that the mental disturbance is real and extreme.”
271
Dobbs, in his treatise on torts, addresses the “third party” category as
one of “four markers of outrage.”
272
Accordingly, when a defendant in-
flicts physical violence or threatens serious economic harm to a person
or property in which the employee is known to have a “special interest,”
such an “important marker” will “tend to support a finding of out-
rage.”
273
As to the “presence” issue, Dobbs further elaborates that “[i]f
the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently outrageous and intended to inflict
severe emotional harm upon a person who is not present, no essential
reason of logic or policy prevents liability.”
274
Nonetheless, Dobbs coun-
sels that “[i]n a good many cases, courts find it convenient to draw the
line against recovery by excluding those who are not present and who
have not had an immediate or nearly immediate sensory perception of
the primary injury.”
275
E. Causation
A causal connection is required between the defendant’s intentional
actions and the plaintiff’s subsequent emotional reaction and distress.
276
Actual causation is required,
277
as is proximate causation, where the
typical proximate causation test is the venerable “foreseeability” doc-
trine.
278
According to one court, “[f]oreseeability is inherent in the find-
ing that [defendant] intentionally inflicted the emotional distress.”
279
Other courts have held that causation can be found where the emotional
distress was either the intended or the “primary consequence” of the de-
fendant’s conduct,”
280
or where there is a “high probability that the [de-
271. Id. at 66 (stating that “[n]early all the cases allowing recovery have involved members of
the immediate family”).
272. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 304, at 827 (“repeating or continuing acts” are one of “four mark-
ers of outrage”).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 834.
275. Id.
276. GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce, 956 S.W.2d 636, 642–43 (Tex. App. 1997), aff’d, 998
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 71 (Cal. 1979) (approving jury instruc-
tion “which provides that damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress may include
‘Reasonable compensation for any financial loss suffered by the plaintiff which was proximately
caused by [the] emotional distress’”).
277. Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
278. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970).
279. GTE Southwest Inc., 956 S.W.2d at 642–43.
280. GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999).
146
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
fendant’s] conduct would inflict severe emotional distress.”
281
Yet, if the
plaintiff’s emotional distress is the primary consequence of circum-
stances or events other than the defendant’s behavior, regardless of how
deliberate or reprehensible, the defendant should not be liable for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
282
F. Damages
1. Compensatory Damages
The difficulty of proving and measuring damages for mental inju-
ries has been advanced as a major reason for the courts’ reluctance to re-
dress the harm caused by this tort.
283
Nonetheless, “mental suffering is
scarcely more difficult of proof, and certainly no harder to estimate in
terms of money, than the physical pain of a broken leg, which never has
been denied compensation. . . .”
284
Furthermore, “[m]edical science has
recognized long since that not only fright and shock, but also grief, anxi-
ety, rage and shame, are in themselves ‘physical injuries, in the sense
that they produce well marked changes in the body, and symptoms that
are readily visible to the professional eye.”
285
Accordingly, as one court
noted, “[s]uch harm, though less susceptible of precise measurement
than more tangible pecuniary losses or physical injuries would be, is no
less real or worthy of compensation.”
286
Today, a plaintiff who prevails on a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is entitled to a broad range of damages.
287
Accordingly, the plaintiff who succeeds on a claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress can recover mental pain and anguish damages
for humiliation, indignation, severe disappointment, wounded pride, de-
spair, anxiety, stress, depression, fright, as well as for any physical or
281. Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1251.
282. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 611 (finding no liability where the emotional distress
is “merely incidental” to the commission of some other tort and is “not the intended or primary con-
sequence of the defendant’s conduct”).
283. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3, §12, at 55.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 56.
286. Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 71 (Cal. 1979).
287. See id. (approving jury instruction “which provides that damages for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress may include ‘Reasonable [sic] compensation for any financial loss suf-
fered by the plaintiff which was proximately caused by [the] emotional distress.’”).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
147
bodily harm attributable to the defendant’s actions.
288
As one court
noted, “[w]hen the mental pain rises to the level that the plaintiff loses
the ability to function in her daily life as she did before the injury, men-
tal anguish damages can be awarded.”
289
Additional damages also en-
compass sums for reasonable and necessary medical expenses, economic
losses, lost income or wages, diminution of earning capacity and even
loss of consortium.
290
Future damages can be awarded so long as there is
a “reasonable probability” they will be sustained in the future.
291
According to one commentator, the recovery of emotional distress
damages by means of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort
serves the main purpose of punitive damages.
292
Since “[t]he emotional
damages awarded normally exceed both the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket ex-
penses due to the injury and any economic goal which the defendant
may have sought through his outrageous conduct,” consequently, “in
many cases emotional damages serve the policy of deterrence which also
underlies punitive damages.”
293
Even if the plaintiff’s actual emotional distress is not compensable
by means of the intentional tort cause of action because the defendant’s
conduct is not sufficiently outrageous, there may be a distress recovery
pursuant to another legal doctrine that has less demanding standards than
those of the common law tort.
294
For example, even if the former em-
ployer’s retaliatory actions against the former employee were not suffi-
ciently outrageous for an intentional tort, an emotional distress recovery
288. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§46(1) (1965); see also Agarwal, 603 P.2d at 71
(finding that a $16,400 jury award to compensate a employee was justified, since emotional distress,
“may include humiliation, anxiety, and mental anguish”); Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61,
67 (Ky. 1996) (affirming a jury award of $70,000 to “peculiarly susceptible” employee for em-
ployer’s intentional infliction of emotional distress in course of wrongful termination); Jackson v.
Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 408 (Tex. App. 2002) (acknowledging that emotional distress
encompasses a wide range of injuries, such as “fright, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, worry,
and nausea”); GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce, 956 S.W.2d 636, 642–43 (Texas App. 1997), aff’d, 998
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (observing that the jury considered past and future damages for physical
pain and mental anguish).
289. Jackson, 84 S.W.3d at 408.
290. GTE Southwest Inc., 956 S.W.2d at 642 (supporting a jury instruction to consider neces-
sary medical expenses when calculating an award); Agarwal, 603 P.2d at 71 (reiterating that dam-
ages may be awarded to compensate a plaintiff for economic loss resulting from “intentionally
caused emotional distress”); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1976) (not-
ing that a plaintiff may support a loss of consortium claim for emotional injuries to one’s spouse,
provided the acts causing such injuries were intentional).
291. GTE Southwest Inc., 956 S.W.2d at 642.
292. Bleeke, supra note 17, at 371.
293. Id. at 370–71.
294. Id.
148
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could be made pursuant to the anti-retaliation provisions of a statutory
cause of action.
295
2. Punitive Damages
Generally, punitive damages cannot be assessed as part of a recov-
ery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
296
The reason is
“that since the outrageous quality of the defendant’s conduct form(s) the
basis of the action, the rendition of compensatory damages was suffi-
ciently punitive.”
297
However, there may be novel ways to use the inher-
ently flagrant misconduct in the intentional infliction cause of action to
secure a punitive type award. For example, when a Title VII discrimina-
tion or sexual harassment cause of action is coupled with a intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, evidence of intentional, malicious,
and outrageous distressing conduct, even if insufficient for the tort “out-
rage” claim, may be used to sustain a recovery of punitive damages
against the employer on the Title VII claim.
298
According to one com-
mentator, the “outrageousness” standard itself in the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress “gives the tort of outrage an unusual pu-
nitive nature.”
299
“Unlike other torts which compensate the victims for
their injuries, damages for the tort of outrage often depend more on the
character of the defendant’s conduct than the extent of the plaintiff’s in-
jury.”
300
Intentional infliction of emotional distress by means of the “outra-
geousness” standard is similar to punitive damages in that both ascertain
the presence and extent of damages pursuant to the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s behavior. However, it appears likely that a plaintiff will
be able to more readily secure a punitive award pursuant to the conven-
295. Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232–33 (D. Utah 2002) (holding that
the plaintiff was entitled to full compensatory damage recovery for consequences of former em-
ployer’s retaliatory actions, including emotional distress component, based on anti-retaliation provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
296. Morrison v. Sandell, 446 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). But see Rulon-Miller v.
IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534–35. (Cal. 1985) (upholding a punitive award of $200,000 for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress when corporate employer discharged plaintiff marketing man-
ager due to her romantic involvement with the manager of a rival firm).
297. Morrison, 446 N.E.2d at 292.
298. Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 477–78 (5th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging pu-
nitive damages may be imposed for the Title VII claim, but not the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim, while refusing to impose punitive damages because the employer possessed a
“good faith” defense in compliance with Title VII).
299. Bleeke, supra note 17, at 370.
300. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
149
tional malice or gross or reckless disregard formulations for punitive
damage recovery, presuming the plaintiff possesses a suitable foundation
for the punitive damage award.
IV. V
ICARIOUS
L
IABILITY
The vicarious liability of the employer for the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress derives from agency law.
301
Pursuant to
conventional agency law principles, an employer will not be liable for
the intentional torts of its employees unless the employer authorizes or
ratifies them.
302
Consequently, even if the behavior by the aggrieved
employee’s supervisors and/or co-workers is deemed sufficiently outra-
geous, the employer will not be held vicariously liable for the conduct
unless the employee presents evidence that the employer authorized or
ratified the conduct.
303
As one federal district court noted, “Kansas, at
least in certain circumstances, would recognize ratification as a viable
theory for holding a principal liable for the intentional tort of his or her
agent.”
304
The mere fact, however, that the employer does not terminate
the offending employees is not alone adequate to establish ratification.
305
Yet, “ongoing tolerance” by management of a course of sexual harass-
ment misconduct, despite the employee’s complaints on multiple occa-
sions, together with the employer’s failure to take any corrective action
against the offender, was deemed to be sufficient ratification.
306
Additionally, courts have held that for an intentional tortious action
by the employee to be imputed vicariously to the employer, there must
be evidence that “such actions were conducted, at least in part, to serve
the employer.”
307
301. See Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 69 (Cal. 1979).
302. Hatley, 308 F.3d at 476.
303. Id. (specifying sexual harassment by supervisors); see also Agarwal, 603 P.2d at 67 (dis-
cussing the ratification of termination for reasons manager knew were not true).
304. Greenhorn v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1256 (D. Kan. 2003).
305. Hatley, 308 F.3d at 476.
306. Greenhorn, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.
307. Paraohoa v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361–62 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
Plaintiff alleges that defendants allowed plaintiff to be subjected to harassment in the
form of unwanted sexual comments, touching, vulgarities, and solicitations by [supervi-
sor] resulting in her demotion and resignation. Once again, plaintiff presents absolutely
no evidence of defendant’s knowledge of such actions by [its supervisor]—much less
their tolerance for such conduct. Also, plaintiff fails to show that [supervisor’s] actions
were taken, even in part, to serve the defendant employer.
Id. at 1362.
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However, in some jurisdictions which take a more expansive ap-
proach, an employer can be held vicariously liable for its employees’ in-
tentional torts, even if they were neither authorized nor ratified, if they
nevertheless were still within the employees’ “scope of employment.”
308
The fact that the wrongful conduct was willful, intentional or even
criminal does not mean it is per se outside the scope of employment.
309
According to one court, if the employee’s intentional conduct is “gener-
ally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment,” the employer
may be vicariously liable.
310
Similarly, according to another court, “[i]f
the intentional tort is committed in the accomplishment of a duty en-
trusted to the employee, rather than because of personal animosity, the
employer may not be liable.”
311
An employee’s conduct will be deemed
outside the scope of employment if it “is different in kind from that au-
thorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little ac-
tuated by a purpose to serve the master.”
312
Similarly, if the employee’s
intentional torts are “committed by the employee for personal motives
unrelated to the furtherance of the employer’s business,” the employer is
not vicariously liable.
313
If the employee is acting “entirely upon his own
impulse, for his own amusement, and for no purpose of or benefit to the
defendant employer,” the employer is not vicariously liable for the em-
ployee’s intentional wrongs.
314
The “proper inquiry,” according to one
state supreme court, “is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her
job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct.”
315
In one intentional infliction case, where co-workers and a manager
ridiculed and demeaned an injured employee on light-duty, the em-
ployer, the owner of a deli, was found to be “vicariously liable for the
308. Wait v. Beck’s N. Am., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 172, 181 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Agarwal v.
Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 68 (Cal. 1979) (reiterating that “an employer is liable for willful and mali-
cious torts of his employee committed in the scope of employment.”); GTE Southwest, Inc. v.
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618–19 (Tex. 1999) (holding that an intentional act must be “closely con-
nected with the servant’s authorized duties”); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620–21 (Wash.
2002).
309. Robel, 59 P.3d at 620–21; Agarwal, 603 P.2d at 67 (“[A]ssuming no ratification or au-
thorization by [defendant], the rule in this state is that the employer is liable for the willful miscon-
duct of his employees acting in a managerial capacity.”).
310. Wait, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
311. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 618.
312. Robel, 59 P.3d at 621 (quoting from R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
A
GENCY
§ 228(2)
(1958)).
313. Wait, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 181; accord GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 618.
314. Higgins v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 2003).
315. Robel, 59 P.3d at 621.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
151
offending conduct of its deli employees.”
316
In that case, the defendant’s
deli workers tormented the employee during working hours and on com-
pany property, while performing the duties they were assigned and inter-
acting with customers and co-workers.
317
The court noted that the record
was devoid of any suggestion “that the abusive employees left their job
stations or neglected their assigned duties to launch their verbal attacks
on [plaintiff]. Nor was the employees’ conduct in this case directed to-
ward deriving personal sexual gratification, an exceptional circumstance
that could have taken the conduct outside the scope of their employ-
ment.”
318
In another example, the employees’ supervisor, a former United
States Army supply sergeant, yelled, screamed and charged at the em-
ployees, with head down and fists balled, and continually uttered profane
and vulgar obscenities.
319
The sergeant made the employees stand in his
office for up to thirty minutes at a time several times a day, simply star-
ing at them but not allowing them to leave.
320
The court ruled that the
supervisor’s “acts, although inappropriate, involved conduct within the
scope of his position as the employees’ supervisor,” and the court noted
that the employer “has cited no evidence that [supervisor’s] actions were
motivated by personal animosity rather than a misguided attempt to
carry out his job duties.”
321
Thus, the court found there was adequate
evidence to support the jury’s finding that the supervisor’s acts were
committed in the “scope of his employment.”
322
The intersection of vicarious liability principles with sexual har-
assment allegations could prove a dangerous area indeed for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress employee who is basing their case
on sexual harassment misconduct. As one court peremptorily declared,
“[i]t is well settled that sexual harassment ‘consisting of unwelcome re-
marks and touching is motivated solely by individual desires and serves
no purpose of the employer.’”
323
In one case, the employer’s shop super-
intendent was alleged to have engaged in a course of inappropriate sex-
ual conduct towards the plaintiff, including unwanted sexual banter,
poking her in the ribs, brushing his hand across her breast, putting his
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 608–09.
320. Id. at 614.
321. Id. at 618.
322. Id.
323. Higgins v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 2003).
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arms around her waist and slapping her in the rear.
324
The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment dismissal of
the employee’s intentional infliction claim against her employer,
325
suc-
cinctly stating that “the alleged sex-related comments and acts cannot be
imputed to [employer] under this doctrine.”
326
Yet, in another case, the
intentional wrongful actions did encompass sexual harassment by super-
visors, including unwanted and inappropriate touching and inappropriate
sexual comments, as well as improper reprimands and attempts to un-
dermine the employee’s work.
327
Although the court sustained the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim against a supervisor, the
court dismissed the interference claim against the employer,
328
explain-
ing that “[a]lthough [supervisor] may have committed the alleged acts
during business hours and abused the authority of his position within
[employer’s company], his conduct cannot be said to have been within
the scope of, or a natural incident of, his employment.”
329
“Inappropriate
sexual comments, gestures and physical contact have been held to be
outside the scope of employment.”
330
“Undermining the plaintiff’s work
at her employer’s firm, does not further the employer’s interest and, as
such, cannot be said to be within the scope of, or a natural incident of,
plaintiff’s employment.”
331
Thus, with reference to the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim, the court ruled that the employer could
not be held vicariously liable for the intentional sexual harassment nor
the undermining misconduct.
332
Vicarious liability is a “two-edged sword” for the employee. If the
employee contends that the misconduct of the managers and supervisors
and other personnel of the employer is not directly related to the em-
ployment relationship or is beyond the course and scope of employment,
the employee may be bolstering an intentional infliction claim by focus-
ing on this offending extraneous conduct. However, the misconduct may
be so unrelated to the employment that it may be deemed to be person-
ally vindictive behavior on the part of the tortfeasor and the employer
will not be held vicariously liable. Consequently, it is a fine line that the
324. Id. at 424.
325. Id. at 428.
326. Id. at 426.
327. Wait v. Beck’s N. Am., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 172, 181 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
328. Id. at 181.
329. Id. at 181 (noting that the supervisor’s conduct consisted of alleged sexual battery, offen-
sive touching, unwarranted reprimands, and attempts to undermine the plaintiff’s work).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 182.
332. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
153
employee must draw. The employee must underscore offensive conduct
that is beyond the norm of the usual employment relationship so as to
secure a finding of outrageousness, but not so far beyond the norm that
the conduct will be deemed merely personal, non-imputable misconduct
by the employer.
V. O
UTRAGE AND
A
NTI
-D
ISCRIMINATION
S
TATUTES
A. Racial Discrimination or Harassment
Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases in the private em-
ployment context are frequently intertwined with claims for discrimina-
tion and harassment pursuant to federal and state civil rights statutes.
Emotional distress can readily result from purposeful discrimination or
harassment, which can be in the form of physical conduct or merely
words. In such a case, the common law of torts becomes entangled with
federal and/or state statutory law, and the discrimination or harassment
may also warrant a common law intentional infliction claim.
When the employee has prevailed on a claim of impermissible dis-
crimination against his or her employer, the finding of discrimination in
and of itself may permit an inference of emotional distress as an ordinary
result of the employer’s discriminatory actions.
333
Nevertheless, most
courts appear very reluctant to automatically extend the tort cause of ac-
tion to a discrimination case;
334
“Acts of discrimination are not necessar-
ily ‘extreme and outrageous.’”
335
Similarly, in Swanson v. Senior Re-
sources Connection,
336
the court noted that discrimination, by itself, is
insufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.
337
In one troublesome case, the employee, a minority, was termi-
nated while similarly situated white employees were treated differ-
ently.
338
Nevertheless the court found the employer’s conduct to be in-
sufficiently outrageous and extreme, even if “driven by an unlawful
333. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 305, at 831. (“[I]n some cases, racial slurs or epithets uttered by an
employer or supervisor . . . may create a hostile and discriminatory work environment that violates
anti-discrimination statutes and may also warrant submission of the outrage question to the jury on a
common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
334. Briggs v. Aldi, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002).
335. Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (W.D.N.C.
2002).
336. 254 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
337. Id. at 962.
338. Briggs, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
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motive” of racial discrimination.
339
The court explained “that if defen-
dant did terminate plaintiff’s employment based on her race, then such
conduct would be ‘outrageous’ as that term is used in everyday par-
lance.”
340
However, since Kansas courts have construed the term nar-
rowly in the discrimination context, the court found that the allegations
were insufficient to rise to the level of outrageousness required to state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
341
Similarly, in an-
other troubling case,
342
a minority employee was demoted in part for
poor attendance, even though similarly situated non-minority employees
with the same or worse attendance records were not demoted.
343
Yet,
even though the court found that a question of fact existed on the race
discrimination claim,
344
the employee’s demotion was insufficiently out-
rageous for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if
racially motivated.
345
The court required “something more” beyond dis-
crimination for extreme and outrageous conduct.
346
Otherwise, the court
warned, “every discrimination would simultaneously become a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
347
Finally, in
yet another very unsettling case, the employee refused to sign a false af-
fidavit to be used in future litigation.
348
Following her refusal, one of her
employer’s representatives made a racially discriminatory statement to
her, and soon afterward she was dismissed from her position.
349
Never-
theless, the court held that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the le-
gally required “outrage” level.
350
Whether the employee’s managers or supervisors engaged in racial
discrimination or harassment for a continuous period of time emerges as
a very important issue in ascertaining whether the racial conduct was
sufficiently extreme and outrageous for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tort. For example, in one federal district court case, the
black employee plaintiff was subjected to “an unceasing farrago of racial
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Bush v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
343. Id. at 791.
344. Id. at 799.
345. Id. at 800–01.
346. Id. at 801 n.17.
347. Id.; accord Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 962 (S.D. Ohio
2003).
348. Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (W.D.N.C.
2002).
349. Id. at 791.
350. Id. at 795.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
155
epithets” by a manager who “openly expressed his desire to eliminate
blacks from the facility, and, in fact, engineered the dismissal of many
black employees.”
351
Moreover, this manager colluded with another
manager, who had also made racial comments, to eliminate black em-
ployees.
352
The defendant managers and company contended that the
employee failed to state a claim “because racial harassment and epithets
do not constitute ‘extreme and outrageous conduct.’”
353
The federal dis-
trict court, in examining state law, responded: “We hesitate to predict
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that racial epithets and
harassment can never be the basis of an IIED claim under Pennsylvania
law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never examined this ques-
tion. . . .”
354
The federal district court did point to one state court deci-
sion in which a store employee used a racial epithet during a dispute
with a customer.
355
However, in that case the lower state court held that
considering the brevity of the encounter as well as the relationship of the
parties, the employee’s conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct.
356
Yet the federal district court did underscore a
point made in the state court decision that could be distinguished from
cases involving “continuing malicious actions or a special relationship
between the parties.”
357
Consequently, the federal district court noted
that the employee’s complaint alleged both “continuous malicious con-
duct” as well as a “special relationship between the parties,”
358
and that
these allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion for dismissal of
the complaint.
359
Nevertheless, a federal district court in Louisiana held
that being “subjected to racial slurs and badgering” by one’s coworkers
did “not rise to the high level of ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct, over
a sufficient period of time, to constitute a tort under existing Louisiana
law.”
360
351. McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 703.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Mitchell v. Tracer Const. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 520, 527 (M.D. La. 2003) (emphasis
added).
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B. Sexual Harassment
Similar to the racial discrimination and harassment cases, the courts
typically hold that sexual harassment, even though violating Title VII,
does not necessarily equate to a finding of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
361
Some courts go even further, noting that “[i]n fact, fed-
eral courts in this circuit have consistently held that even acts of lewd
physical touching and obscene suggestive comments in sexual harass-
ment cases . . . were not sufficiently outrageous, as a matter of law, to
establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
employment context.”
362
To illustrate, one federal district court ruled
that a regional manager’s “sexually-themed comments” to and in front of
subordinate employees did not meet the state standard of “the most
egregious conduct” for intentional infliction of emotional distress liabil-
ity, even though the comments were consisted of the most vulgar, sexu-
ally explicit and racist terms .
363
However, as noted by Dobbs, “[a] number of courts have recog-
nized that sexual harassment (at work or elsewhere) justifies a recovery
for intentional infliction of [emotional] distress.
364
Although the “more
common case of sexual harassment” is in the employment context and
sometimes by co-workers, “the classic case of abusing power or position
occurs when a supervisor or employer engages in or refuses to halt such
indignities.”
365
Thus, Bushell v. Dean
366
“is consistent with cases holding
that pervasive sexual harassment, particularly involving vulgar, obscene,
or physically assaultive conduct and inappropriate sexual coercion by
supervisors of subordinates, can justify a finding of outrageousness.”
367
For example, in Wait v. Beck’s North America, Inc.,
368
the employee’s
supervisors’ sexual harassment was sufficient to withstand dismissal,
when such conduct including inappropriate and unwanted touching,
comments and conduct toward other females.
369
In Greenhorn v. Mar-
361. See, e.g., Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 2002).
362. Paraohoa v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
363. Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595–96, 604 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
364. D
OBBS
, supra note 2, § 305, at 831; see also Greenwood v. Delphi Auto. Sys., 257 F.
Supp. 2d 1047, 1073–74 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (discussing Sixth Circuit law regarding “what constitutes
extreme and outrageous conduct in the sexual harassment context”).
365. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 305, at 831.
366. 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991).
367. Duffy, supra note 12, at 387.
368. 241 F. Supp. 2d 172 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
369. Id. at 186.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
157
riott International, Inc.,
370
the offender’s sexual harassment misconduct
was so flagrant—forcibly kissing the employee, exposing himself, and
attempting to require the plaintiff to perform oral sex on him—that the
misconduct formed the basis for a sexual harassment count as well as an
intentional infliction tort and other intentional tort counts to proceed
through summary dismissal stage.
371
These courts and commentators
correctly recognize that the tort action of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress can arise as a separate legal wrong during the course of
the employment discrimination and/or harassment. The main legal
wrong is derived from the statutory, typically federal, civil rights dis-
crimination or harassment action based on the discriminating or harass-
ing conduct itself, while the ancillary state common law claim is predi-
cated on the outrageous manner in which the discrimination or
harassment occurred. It will be especially important for the plaintiff to
clearly differentiate and specify the independent tort “infliction” con-
duct, not only to sustain the tort, but also to avoid its preemption. In such
circumstances, the common law tort claim can provide an additional
means of protection for the mistreated and perhaps terminated employee.
VI. O
UTRAGE AS AN
E
XCEPTION TO
E
MPLOYMENT
-A
T
-W
ILL
Due to inherent inequality of the typical employer-employee rela-
tionship, especially an employment-at-will one, many terminated at will
employees have used the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress as part of their general “wrongful discharge” actions against their
former employers.
372
Considering the usual superiority in bargaining and
economic power of the employer in this theoretically symmetrical at will
relationship, and also considering the difficulties involved in finding or
carving out a viable exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, it is
not unexpected that many employees have attempted to utilize the tort of
370. 258 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2003).
371. Id. at 1262.
372. For a thorough article exploring the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
the employment at will context, see Duffy, supra note 12. Duffy views the “[a]pplication of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context as part of a larger judicial
and legislative trend toward ‘tortification’ of labor and employment law, in which the paradigmatic
vehicle for vindication of workers’ rights is the private individual civil action.” Id. at 392. However,
Duffy believes that “[t]his trend represents a false promise for workers, in that the beneficial effects
of civil tort litigation are episodic and do not generally effectuate real changes in the workplace be-
havior of employers.” Id. For another discussion of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the employment setting of employment-at-will and wrongful discharge, see Bleeke, supra
note 17.
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intentional infliction as another independent tort weapon in their
“wrongful discharge” arsenal.
The use of the intentional infliction of emotional distress as another
independent tort “exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine has
been met, however, with decidedly mixed judicial results. Certain courts
are absolutely adamant that if the employee is an employee-at-will, the
employee is without recourse to sue for wrongful discharge by means of
a tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
373
According to
the Wyoming Supreme Court, the fact that the employment relationship
is at will is a “complete defense” to an intentional infliction of emotional
distress lawsuit predicated on the employee’s termination, “even if the
employer knows that the termination will cause the employee emotional
distress.”
374
For example, in the Wyoming case,
375
the at will employee
was a manager at a copy store who had been receiving “above-standard”
reviews.
376
When the sales revenue of the store began to decline, she be-
gan receiving negative reviews from her staff regarding the way she per-
formed her job and the manner in which she treated her employees.
377
The plaintiff admitted she was having difficulties, and attributed part of
her problems to the fact that her mother was fighting and ultimately lost
a long battle with cancer.
378
The plaintiff was instructed to develop a
plan for improving her performance, so she made various attempts to
contact her regional manager for assistance in drafting her plan.
379
How-
ever, the regional manager said that he could not discuss the situation,
then terminated her when the plaintiff failed to draft a plan for improve-
373. Trabing v. Kinko’s, Inc., 57 P.3d 1248, 1256 (Wyo. 2002); Abeles v. Mellon Bank Corp.,
747 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Duffy, supra note 12, at 395–96.
In general, . . . discharging an at will employee will not be sufficient to make out a cause
of action absent any other tortious conduct. This is so because the at will rule, despite its
recent erosion, is considered by the courts to be an established presumption of the ‘civi-
lized society’ of the employment relationship. If the employment is truly at will, an em-
ployer may terminate an employee without cause for any reason, good, bad, or nonexis-
tent. In such a situation, the employer is arguably doing nothing more than exercising his
legal rights in a way permitted by the at will rule—discharge for any reason deemed suf-
ficient by the employer. Thus, for many courts, distress caused by the discharge from at
will employment is simply part of the accepted risks of employment to which employees
must become accustomed.
Id.
374. Trabing, 57 P.3d at 1256.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1251.
377. Id. at 1251–52.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1252.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
159
ment by the deadline.
380
The plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Although the jurisdiction recognized the tort in the
employment context, the fact that the plaintiff’s employment status was
at will operated as a “complete defense” to her claim.
381
The court ex-
plained that her employer “did nothing more than act within its legal
rights when it terminated [her] employment.”
382
In another case, the defendant firm’s accountant enticed an em-
ployee at will into a scheme to help the employee pay for her increasing
health care premiums by “padding” her time card.
383
The accountant
supposedly valued the plaintiff as an employee, and was allegedly acting
with the knowledge and consent of the firm’s principals.
384
When the
owner of the firm presumably discovered the discrepancy in the plain-
tiff’s time card, he accused her of embezzlement, demanded the repay-
ment of several thousand dollars, threatened criminal action and thereby
forced the plaintiff to resign.
385
The employee sued generally for wrong-
ful discharge and specifically for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
386
The state appellate court, although noting that “the conduct
alleged in this case may have been distressful or hurtful to the plaintiff,”
declared that it was insufficiently “extreme or outrageous” for inten-
tional distress tort liability.
387
The superseding judicial view of the at will relationship, together
with the constrained view of the tort fails to realize that even though the
employer in an at will situation, may possess the general legal right to
terminate the employee for any reason, the employer should not be insu-
lated from abusive and coercive conduct that occurs prior to, during and
after the discharge. Such a draconian at will standard provides the moti-
vation for employers to discharge employees by granting “blanket” im-
munity for disingenuous discharge conduct, which can produce some
very harsh and unjust results.
Other courts hold that the employee’s at will status does not auto-
matically preclude the cause of action, but asserts that even a “wrongful”
at will termination, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of extreme
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1256.
382. Id.
383. Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1261.
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and outrageous conduct.
388
The Texas Supreme Court has provided the
main rationale, stating that “there would be little left of the employment-
at-will doctrine if an employer’s public statements of the reason for ter-
mination was, so long as the employee disputed that reason, in and of it-
self some evidence that a tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress had been committed.”
389
A termination, according to one court, is
“likely to be an upsetting episode,” but alone is not grounds for an inten-
tional infliction lawsuit.
390
For example, in one recent case, the plaintiff,
an employee at will, was discharged for her refusal to sign a false affida-
vit to be used for future litigation.
391
Even though she had a viable
wrongful discharge claim because state law forbids perjury, she did not
automatically have an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.
392
In another case, an at will insurance agent, who blew the whis-
tle on an insurance kickback scheme involving one of the company’s ad-
justers and several of its agents, was terminated after an allegedly negli-
gent investigation naming him as one of the suspects, even though the
agent was never prosecuted.
393
Here, the court proclaimed that the insur-
ance company’s “conduct was within the bounds of its discretion to su-
pervise, review, discipline, and ultimately terminate its independent
agents in light of allegations regarding an ongoing kickback scheme.”
394
In another case, the plaintiff at will employee was questioned in front of
other employees regarding his personal use of his employer’s credit
card. He was escorted out of the building into an open “bull pen area,”
395
where a co-worker announced in front of other employees that the plain-
tiff was being terminated and would not be eligible for rehire.
396
The
388. Frank v. Delta Airlines, 314 F.3d 195, 202 n. 11 (5th 2002) (“[U]nder Texas law, termina-
tion from employment without more, even if the termination is wrongful, does not give rise to a
claim of IIED.”) (interpreting Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 216–17 (Tex. 1999)); Dir-
ham v. Van Wert Co. Hosp., No. 3:99CV7485, 2000 WL 621139 at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2000)
(“[T]he settled rule in Ohio is that the mere claim that a termination was unjustified does not rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”); Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998) (stating
that “even wrongful termination is not extreme and outrageous.”).
389. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002) (citing Dia-
mond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992)).
390. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 962–63 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
391. Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (W.D.N.C.
2002).
392. Id.
393. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 84 S.W.3d at 611.
394. Id.
395. Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App. 2003).
396. Id.; see also Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex.
1998) (holding that wrongful termination is not extreme and outrageous conduct).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
161
court, noting that ordinary employment disputes do not constitute ex-
treme and outrageous conduct, ruled that the employee had not met his
burden.
397
These courts, though not summarily rejecting the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the at will context, are evidently disin-
clined to create another judicially recognized “exception” to circumvent
the general rule of employment-at-will. Those courts which bar the tort
from application in the context of employment-at-will often arbitrarily
fail to recognize that despite the employer’s legal right to terminate an at
will employee, the employer’s representatives’ conduct before, during,
and especially after the discharge may be separate and distinct from the
reasons for the discharge. The conduct may be so offensive, abusive, co-
ercive, or retaliatory so as to give rise to a valid intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort claim.
398
VII. D
EFENSES AND
P
RIVILEGES
A. Generic Intentional Tort Defenses and Privileges
As a general rule, there are no affirmative defenses that are specific
to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; but the tradi-
tional intentional tort defenses of consent and self-defense can form
397. Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 805.
398. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 28, 39 (D.C. 2003);
McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Assocs., 226 F. Supp. 695, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Agarwal v. John-
son, 603 P.2d 58, 67 (Cal. 1979); Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534–35 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985); Nicholson v. Windham, 571 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that dis-
charge of employee for refusing to commit allegedly illegal acts supports claim); Pavilon v. Kaferly,
561 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“A jury reasonably could have found that [defendant’s]
specific acts of [sexual harassment misconduct], as well as his cumulative pattern of conduct toward
[plaintiff], commencing while she was still his employee and continuing long after he fired her, con-
stituted extreme and outrageous conduct.”); Kroger Co. v. Wilgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 66–67 (Ky.
1996) (affirming jury’s decision that the employer coerced employee into signing release of liability
papers was a plan of “attempted fraud, deceit, slander and interference with contractual rights”);
Rigby v. Fallsway Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d 1056, 1065–66 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (stating that im-
proper and frequent contact with discharged employee at home was not sufficient to support inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc. 84 S.W.3d 397, 407–08
(Tex. App. 2002) (discussing post-termination misconduct); see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 397
(noting that a “[f]ew courts have used the outrageousness tort to challenge the fairness or motivation
underlying an employer’s decision to discharge discipline, or otherwise alter the terms and condi-
tions of at will employment”).
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valid affirmative defenses.
399
Moreover, some New York courts have
held that if the “conduct underlying the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim falls within the ambit of traditional tort liability,” a
cause of action for intentional interference will not lie.
400
For example,
in a New York federal district court case, the employee based her inten-
tional tort case on sexual harassment conduct by her supervisors, which
included unwanted touching and reprimands that may have undermined
the plaintiff’s work.
401
This wrongful conduct as a basis for the inten-
tional infliction claim, “overlaps other traditional tort claims,” such as
battery and defamation, and therefore could not be used to support the
plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
402
How-
ever, since other aspects of the defendant supervisors’ wrongful sexual
harassment conduct, such as inappropriate sexual comments, did “not
fall within the ambit of any traditional torts,” the employee could main-
tain her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
403
As to privileges, the Restatement (Second) of Torts marks the de-
fendant’s assertion or insistence of his or her legal rights, “in a permissi-
ble way,” as privileged conduct. Although the defendant’s conduct may
otherwise be extreme and outrageous and even though the defendant is
“well aware” that such an assertion or insistence is “certain” to cause
emotional distress, such conduct remains privileged.
404
B. Arbitration
A court may dismiss an employee’s intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim due to an arbitration clause in an employee’s con-
tract, since the court will dismiss all claims when they can be arbi-
trated.
405
Courts also look at the inequality in the bargaining power
between the employer and the employee before dismissing the em-
ployee’s claim, but that alone will not hold an arbitration agreement in
the employment context unenforceable.
406
399. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 §18, at 113, 125.
400. Wait v. Beck’s N. Am., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Hansel v.
Sheridan, 991 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)).
401. Id. at 181.
402. Id. at 182.
403. Id.
404. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. g (1965).
405. Lloyd v. Hovensa, L.L.C., 243 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353 (D.V.I. 2003).
406. Id. at 349.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
163
C. Statutes of Limitations
The “running” of an applicable statute of limitations will bar the
employee’s claim. Depending on the state in which a claim is filed, the
statute of limitations for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress can typically be one,
407
two
408
or three years.
409
However, some
courts have utilized a “continuing violation” theory that can be used to
extend the technical statute of limitations period if there was a course of
objectionable conduct and if the final objectionable act occurred within
the pertinent statutory limitations period.
410
D. Preemption and Exclusivity
1. State Statutes
State Workers’ Compensation statutes may be a bar to the common
law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
411
As one
court explained, “[w]orkers’ compensation exclusivity rests on the no-
407. Wait, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (noting the statute of limitations in New York for an inten-
tional tort is one year).
408. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 619 (Tex. 1999); Jackson v. Creditwatch,
Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 404 (Tex. App. 2002).
409. Kennedy v. St. Francis Hosp., 225 F. Supp. 2d, 128, 144 (D. Conn. 2002) (finding that
employee’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred because the alleged con-
duct took place more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint).
410. Wait, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 180; see also Bonner v. Guccione, 916 F. Supp. 271, 277
(S.D.N.Y 1996) (explaining that where a plaintiff is the target of a planned program of harassment
and some of the conduct falls within the limitations period, a cause of action may be established).
411. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Dept. Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 744 (Cal. 1987) (finding that employee
could not maintain civil action for intentional distress against employer and fellow employee be-
cause mental disability conduct was compensable under the exclusive remedy provisions of Work-
ers’ Compensation law); see also D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 305, at 831–32; Duffy, supra note 12, at
414 (“Even assuming that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace
can be established, the tort’s practical effect is limited in many jurisdictions by preemption provi-
sions in state and federal law, the most notable of which are state workers’ compensation statutes.”).
For a further discussion of this topic see Raymond A. Cowley, “Mixed Blessing: The Texas Supreme
Court’s Comments on the Availability of the Workers’ Compensation Defense in Employment Tort
Cases,” T
EX
. B.J., at 470 (2003). Cowley comments that the Texas Supreme Court recently indi-
cated that “intentional tort claims, depending on the particular facts presented, may in fact fall
within the Act’s exclusive remedy provision and thus be barred when brought against a subscribing
employer.” Id. at 474; see also, GTE, 998 S.W.2d at 611 (ruling that severe emotional distress
caused by a supervisor’s continuing abuse was not a “compensable injury” under the Texas Work-
ers’ Compensation Act, and thus a employee’s lawsuit for intentional infliction of emotional distress
was not barred by the Act).
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tion that, as a quid pro quo for swift and certain payment on a no-fault
basis, workers cede the possibly greater recovery that might arise from a
range of fault-based tort claims.”
412
In the context of private employ-
ment, the employer often will raise the exclusivity provisions of its
state’s workers’ compensation statute as a defense against the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress.
413
Due to such statutes, an em-
ployee’s ability to sue his or her employer in tort is a very narrowly cir-
cumscribed right, typically based on circumstances involving allegations
of intentional wrongdoing.
414
The court further explained that workers’
compensation “exclusivity only extends to conduct which is part of the
normal risks of the employment relationship.”
415
Thus, intentional, de-
liberate or reckless misconduct in the workplace by the employer and the
employee’s co-workers may overcome the traditional tort immunity in
workers’ compensation statutory schemes.
416
For example, the exclusiv-
ity of workers’ compensation was held not to bar an employee’s “deriva-
tive emotional distress claim” based on the anti-retaliation provisions of
the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
417
Similarly, a recovery for emo-
tional distress was allowed when the distress was caused by the em-
ployer’s violation of the statute that prohibits the discharge of an em-
ployee for claiming or attempting to claim workers’ compensation.
418
Nevertheless, worker’s compensation statutes have been interpreted in
some states to bar any claims against the employer for the intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the employment
relationship.
419
Of course, if the extreme and outrageous conduct oc-
curred after the termination of the employment relationship, and was
sufficiently separate and distinct from the termination, then the em-
ployee can make a convincing argument that the jurisdiction’s workers’
412. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
413. Duffy, supra note 12, at 414–17.
414. Thomas v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 845 So. 2d 498, 503 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Alford v.
Catalytica Pharm., Inc., 577 S.E.2d 293, 293 (N.C. 2003) (holding that intentional misconduct by
employer is regarded as an “exception to the general exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation
Act”); (discussing intentional act exception to state Workers’ Compensation Act but deciding that it
was not applicable to the case at bar due to lack of evidence); Hanford v. Plaza Packaging Corp.,
760 N.Y.S.2d 31, 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (reviewing the determination by Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board that employee’s injury was accidental, thus barring the employee’s intentional infliction
tort claim against co-worker).
415. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
416. Alford, 577 S.E.2d at 293; see also Robert L. Dietz, Torts in the Workplace: How Exclu-
sive is the Exclusive Remedy?, LXVIII F
LA
. B.J. No. 3, at 72 (March 1994).
417. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
418. Dietz, supra note 416, at 72 (citing Scott v. Otis Elevator, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990)).
419. See Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
165
compensation statute does not apply to or preempt their intentional in-
fliction claim.
420
Co-workers also may be held liable in tort for their in-
tentional wrongs in the workplace, thereby superseding the traditional
workers’ compensation protection of employees for their negligent
wrongs.
421
State civil rights statutes also may bar a state common law claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the state’s Human Rights Act pre-
empted the employee’s intentional infliction tort claim.
422
In that case,
the employee sued her employer and supervisor for sexual harassment
and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the fact that the
supervisor had directly requested sex from the plaintiff, a subordinate
employee.
423
The court ruled that the presence of a factual dispute pre-
cluded the dismissal on summary judgment of the plaintiff’s statutory
sexual harassment claim.
424
Regarding the common law tort claim, how-
ever, the court held that it was preempted by the state statute.
425
The
court affirmed summary judgment on the preemption issue, explaining
that the state statute would preempt any claim that is “inextricably
linked” to the allegation of sexual harassment, which must be brought
before the state’s Human Rights Commission, and noted that the em-
ployee’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was sup-
ported by “factual allegations identical to those set forth in her Title VII
sexual harassment claim.”
426
Similarly, the federal district court for the
Northern District of Iowa ruled that Iowa’s Civil Rights Act preempted
an employee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
427
The
court explained that the employee’s state tort claim, predicated on sex,
national origin, disability discrimination and harassment, was preempted
by the state statute because the employee, in her intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, “relie[d] on precisely the same allegations as
her discrimination claims.”
428
However, the Illinois Appellate court
ruled that the employee’s intentional infliction tort case, although based
on a pattern of sexual harassment misconduct, was not preempted by the
420. Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1996).
421. Dietz, supra note 416, at 75.
422. See Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Serv., Inc. 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002).
423. Id. at 904–05.
424. Id. at 905.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1139–40 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
428. Id. at 1137.
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state’s Human Rights Law because “the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress required proof of more than was required for sexual
harassment and served a different policy than that served by the Human
Rights Act . . . .”
429
2. Federal Statutes
Federal statutes can also preempt state claims for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
430
Federal law will supersede state law pursu-
ant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
431
when: (1) Congress
has expressly preempted state law; (2) a Congressional intent to preempt
may be inferred from the presence of a “pervasive” federal regulatory
scheme; or (3) a state law conflicts with a federal law.
432
Moreover, if a
federal regulatory agency has “substantially subsumed” the subject mat-
ter of the state tort in question, preemption will occur.
433
Regarding the
common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort
can be preempted by federal and state statutes. For example, the Omni-
bus Transportation Employee Testing Act
434
and Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration regulations
435
preempted the intentional tort when an air-
craft mechanic employee sued his employer for falsely accusing him of
adulterating his specimen for a drug test, refusing to administer a proper
drug test, improperly relying on tests with no scientific validity, and for
discharging him for the failure to take the test.
436
Similarly, in Chapman
v. Labone,
437
a plaintiff railroad employee’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim based on the employee’s drug test was pre-
empted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, according to the federal dis-
trict court for the Southern District of Iowa, because the drug-testing
regulations promulgated by the Department of Transportation “substan-
tially subsume the subject matter” of state tort law regarding drug testing
of railway employees.
438
Preemption of state common law torts by federal labor law is a ma-
jor area of concern. In particular, the preemption of the tort of intentional
429. Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
430. Frank v. Delta Airlines, 314 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 2002).
431. U.S. C
ONST
. art. VI.
432. Frank, 314 F.3d at 197.
433. Id. at 202.
434. Id. at 197.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 202.
437. Chapman v. Labone, 252 F. Supp. 2d 814 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
438. Id. at 818.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
167
infliction of emotional distress is, according to one court, a “thorny
area.”
439
In the field of labor relations, Section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act
440
provides that all lawsuits seeking redress for
the violation of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in
federal court.
441
Section 301 consequently has been interpreted to pre-
empt state law claims that substantially depend on the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
442
With regard to a plaintiff covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, who is attempting to sue his or her employer for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently commented:
[W]e have previously acknowledged its difficulty and the uphill battle
a plaintiff typically faces to explain why the tort claim is not being
used to alter the terms agreed to under the CBA, or to sidestep its
grievance procedures. There is a wide range of action or inaction an
employer might take that, while seemingly unfair or insensitive, may
be the product of negotiated terms of the CBA and subject to arbitra-
tion. If . . . the plaintiff’s outrage claim attempts to enforce rights or
duties established by the CBA while sidestepping the CBA’s dispute
resolution processes, it is preempted.
443
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then delineated some “general prin-
ciples,” whereby the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
will be preempted:
First, if the CBA specifically covers the conduct at issue, the claim will
generally be preempted. In such circumstances the allegedly wrongful
behavior has been the product of negotiation between the employer
and the employee, and allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the claim
will tend to allow circumvention of the CBA’s grievance and arbitra-
tion provisions. . . . Conversely, we have explained that if the CBA
does not ‘cover’ the allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct, the in-
tentional infliction claim will not [be] preempted.
444
In the case before the Ninth Circuit, the employee argued that her em-
ployer, Boeing, committed the tort of intentional outrage by repeatedly
439. Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002).
440. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2000).
441. Id.; see also Humble, 305 F.3d at 1007 (holding that “all suits seeking relief for violation
of a CBA may be brought in federal court”).
442. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1007.
443. Id. at 1012–13.
444. Id. at 1013.
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placing her in a job which she could not medically perform and by not
accommodating her upon her return from medical leave.
445
The court, in
ruling that the employee’s intentional tort claim was preempted, ex-
plained:
There is a provision of the CBA that fairly directly addresses the situa-
tion at issue in this case. The parties have negotiated that when an em-
ployee returns from medical leave and is not medically able to perform
his or her existing job, Boeing has an obligation to consider an em-
ployee for any other position that is open and that the employee is able
to perform. Whether Boeing fulfills this obligation on any given occa-
sion is an issue to be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution
procedures established by the CBA.
446
Similarly, in another Ninth Circuit case, the court ruled that the em-
ployee’s common law tort actions for intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress
447
were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act because the state law claims required the
court to interpret the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
448
Much like the Labor Management Relations Act, the Railway La-
bor Act can cause preemption of an employee’s state tort claim.
449
For
example, in one case, the employee, a railroad worker, sued his railroad
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on his
termination for initially failing to provide a sample for a drug test and
then for a laboratory transmitting his test results to his employer. How-
ever, the federal district court ruled that the intentional tort distress
claim, as well as his other state law tort claims for invasion of privacy,
misrepresentation and defamation, were preempted by the federal Rail-
way Labor Act.
450
The court first stated the fundamental preemption
standard and rationale:
If the resolution of a state-law claim “depends upon the meaning of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which
might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-
445. Id. at 1012, 1014.
446. Id. at 1014.
447. Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 320 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003). The negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim resulted from his termination for allegedly unannounced absenteeism, due to
the employee’s traveling to Mexico with his wife to attend her father’s funeral. See id. at 953–55.
448. Id. at 959–60.
449. Howell v. Lab One, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 987, 989 (D. Neb. 2003).
450. Id. at 989.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
169
law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law
principles—necessarily uniform throughout the nation—must be em-
ployed to resolve the dispute.”
451
In the case at bar, the court further explained that the resolution of
the drug testing dispute would involve the interpretation or application
of the existing collective bargaining agreement, and would be “inextri-
cably intertwined” with the provisions of the agreement, thereby
mandating the preemption of the drug testing based state tort claims.
452
If the employee’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is predicated on the employer’s benefit plan, the employee will
confront a serious preemption problem created by the Federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
453
ERISA provisions
explicitly “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan (covered by ERISA).”
454
One federal district court concisely explained the expansive preemptive
reach of the ERISA statute:
Congress’ intent in enacting ERISA was to completely preempt the
area of employee benefit plans and to make regulation of benefit plans
solely a federal concern. The Supreme Court has consistently empha-
sized the expansive sweep of the preemption clause. “Thus, only those
state laws and state law claims whose effect on employee benefit plans
is merely tenuous, remote or peripheral are not preempted.” The Sixth
Circuit, too, “has repeatedly recognized that virtually all state law
claims relating to an employee benefit plan are preempted by ERISA.”
Regardless of the label that a plaintiff assigns, a state law claim is pre-
empted if it makes reference to, or has a connection with, an ERISA
plan.
455
In the case before the district court, the employee’s intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim involved “the non-payment of disability re-
tirement benefits and thus, ‘relates to (an) employee benefit plan, and
therefore [is] preempted’ by ERISA.”
456
451. Id. at 990–91 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06
(1988)).
452. Id. at 992.
453. Marshall v. Ormet Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815–16 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
454. Id. at 815 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002)).
455. Id. (citations omitted).
456. Id. at 816.
170
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The Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),
457
however, has been
interpreted to neither expressly nor impliedly preempt a former railroad
employee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Employer
post-injury claims-handling practices, including rejecting a settlement
offer and then discontinuing the employee’s wage advances, thereby
leaving the employee with no means to support his family, are not pre-
empted.
458
The court concluded that FELA did not “so pervasively ‘oc-
cupy the field’ of recovery for injured railroad employees as to preempt
all supplemental state remedies.”
459
Moreover, the Reidelbach court ex-
plained that “the State has an overriding interest in protecting its citizens
from fraudulent, malicious, and bad faith claims practices and the inten-
tional infliction of emotional injury, . . . and there is virtually no risk that
the state cause of action would interfere with the effective administration
of FELA.”
460
Similarly, FELA was deemed not to preempt an em-
ployee’s claim
461
when the plaintiff, an African-American male, was de-
nied a higher paying position which was given to a white employee with
less seniority.
462
When the plaintiff complained, he was confronted with
a “snickering supervisor” and a hangman’s noose above the supervisor’s
door.
463
The federal district court reasoned that since FELA is the “ex-
clusive remedy” for allegations of physical harm, and since the plaintiff
alleged emotional harm, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was not cognizable under FELA. Thus the claim was actionable
only pursuant to state tort law.
464
Moreover, the court explained that
“nothing in the statutory design of FELA or its subsequent judicial inter-
pretations compels a conclusion that FELA ‘occupies the field’ to such
an extent that non-actionable FELA claims cannot be pursued as state
law torts.”
465
E. First Amendment Concerns
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
466
as well
as “free speech” rights in state constitutions, may provide a defense to
457. Federal Employee Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2000).
458. Reidelbach v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 60 P.3d 418, 421, 428 (Mont. 2002).
459. Id. at 425.
460. Id. at 430.
461. Starks v. Northeast Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 245 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
462. Id. at 898.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 899–900.
465. Id. at 900.
466. U.S. C
ONST
. amend. I.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
171
the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
467
Prosser and
Keeton states:
There is still, in this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express
an unflattering opinion of another, however wounding it may be to the
other’s feelings; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech but
also of avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is still very de-
sirable that some safety valve be left through which irascible tempers
may blow off relatively harmless steam.
468
According to Dobbs, referring to the context of racial slurs,
“[c]onceivably, the First Amendment’s protection of free speech could
impose a degree of constraint on liability for verbal infliction of emo-
tional harm.”
469
VIII. B
URDENS OF
P
ROOF AND
P
ERSUASION
AND
R
OLES OF
C
OURT AND
J
URY
An employee clearly may recover damages for the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in an employment context.
470
The
plaintiff, however, bears the burden of proving all the elements of the
cause of action.
471
In establishing the “outrage” element, the employee
must provide “substantial evidence” of outrageous conduct.
472
However,
a jury is allowed to make a “reasonable inference” from the facts to ad-
duce that a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous.
473
With re-
gard to the presence and degree of distress, the employee, as plaintiff,
467. See Van Dyun v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing the “ac-
tual malice” and “public concern” standards of New York Times v. Sullivan in reference to a tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, but in the context of an abortion protest case rather than
an employment dispute).
468. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 §12, at 59.
469. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 305, at 830 (“The question has been considered in connection with
statutory anti-discrimination laws, which to some extent parallel the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress; but the answer has not identified itself.”).
470. See, e.g., Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 320 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing California
law); Leavitt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316–17 (D. Me. 2003); Darboe v. Sta-
ples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New Jersey law); Proctor v. Wackenhut
Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F.
Supp. 2d 1097, 1138 (N.D. Iowa 2002); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 405 (Tex.
App. 2002).
471. See Gradilla, 320 F.3d at 959; Leavitt, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 316–17; Darboe, 243 F. Supp.
2d at 19; Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Martinez, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1137–38; Jackson, 84
S.W.3d at 405.
472. Martinez, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
473. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 963 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
172
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[Vol. 21:1
must assume the burden of validating his or her actual severe emotional
distress.
474
Showing objective manifestations of physical harm produced
by the distress naturally will aid the plaintiff in sustaining this burden.
The seminal issue as to whether the defendant’s conduct is reasona-
bly sufficient to satisfy the extreme and outrageous standard so as to
permit recovery is initially a question of law for the court to deter-
mine.
475
For example, in one state appellate case,
476
the court ruled that
as a matter of law the plaintiff’s termination for violating the employer’s
conduct policy, which forbade fighting or attempting bodily harm, did
not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct and thus was not action-
able as an intentional infliction of emotional distress.
477
In another case,
the federal district court, applying Florida law, held that as a matter of
law “even acts of lewd physical touching and obscene suggestive com-
ments in sexual harassment cases, such as those alleged here, were not
sufficiently outrageous. . . .”
478
In another case,
479
the state appellate
court ruled that as a matter of law it was not extreme and outrageous
conduct for the employer’s accountant to solicit the employee to partici-
pate in a scheme to secure her health benefits, and then for the defendant
employer’s principal owner to accuse the plaintiff of embezzlement and
to force her to resign.
480
The court concluded that the conduct, “may
have been distressful or hurtful,” but it was not as a matter of law ex-
treme and outrageous.
481
Similarly, another federal district court ruled
that a supervisor criticizing an employee on three separate occasions for
his work performance, demoting the employee, as well as calling the
employee a “nothing” and a “nobody,” did not “create a genuine issue of
material fact” and “[n]o reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s
474. Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (indicating that evidence must show the distress was so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it).
475. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. h (1965); see also Leavitt, 238 F. Supp. 2d
at 317; Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Communications of N.C., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 793 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (applying North Carolina law); Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Utah 2002); Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2003); Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002);
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex. 1999); Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l
Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Texas App. 2003); Jackson, 84 S.W.3d at 407; Robel v. Roundup
Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
476. Powdertech Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
477. Id. at 1263.
478. Paraohoa v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
479. Carnemolla v. Walsh, 815 A.2d 1251 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
480. Id. at 1254, 1260.
481. Id. at 1261.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
173
conduct was extreme and outrageous.”
482
Finally, in Leavitt v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,
483
the plaintiff alleged that since her employer did not ac-
commodate her disability, assigned her to an evening shift against her
wishes, and did not facilitate her transfer to a store closer to home, such
conduct was extreme and outrageous.
484
Although noting that the defen-
dant employer’s conduct “frustrated” the plaintiff and “caused her to feel
humiliated,”
485
the court ruled that “no factfinder could reasonably find
that [the employer’s] conduct met the extreme and outrageous standard,”
and thus dismissed the intentional infliction claim on summary judg-
ment.
486
One commentator has underscored the role of the judiciary in mak-
ing this initial legal determination as a proper “gatekeeper” role for the
courts in order to police this “vague” and “punitive” tort.
487
This brand
of judicial “activism” has been posited as a means for keeping these
cases away from overly emotional and “sympathetic” juries.
488
Another
commentator has also noted that “[t]he Restatement provides that the
judge is to perform a gate-keeping function.”
489
Concomitantly, as one
court remarked in explaining why courts are hesitant to find this claim in
an employment situation, “[c]ourts are concerned that, if everyday job
stresses resulting from discipline, personality conflicts, job transfers or
even terminations could give rise to a cause of action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, nearly every employee would have a cause
of action.”
490
Nonetheless, there are cases in which the courts appear too
fervent in fulfilling the “gatekeeper” function.
491
For example, in one
federal district court case applying Oklahoma law, the employee with
eight years service was terminated after returning from a hospitalization
after being assured by the employer’s representatives that he would be
“taken care of.”
492
Despite this assurance, the employee’s termination
notice was taped to the door of his home while his wife was present,
482. Darboe v. Staples, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 5, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New Jersey
law).
483. 238 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D. Me. 2003).
484. Id. at 315–16.
485. Id. at 317.
486. Id.
487. Bleeke, supra note 17, at 371.
488. Id.
489. Duffy, supra note 12, at 394–95 (stating that the generalized and often conflicting com-
ments to the Restatement provide little guidance to judges, telling them, in essence, that ‘outrageous
conduct . . . is conduct that is outrageous’”).
490. Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858, 867 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
491. See EEOC v. Voss Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (W.D. Okla. 2003).
492. Id.
174
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[Vol. 21:1
thereby causing a stress-related re-hospitalization.
493
Although the de-
fendant employer knew of the plaintiff’s medical condition, the court
concluded that “the facts fail to demonstrate conduct sufficiently outra-
geous to satisfy either elements of the Court’s gatekeeper analysis.”
494
The court declared that although the defendant’s conduct may have been
“callous and condemnable,” it did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous.
495
Admittedly, it is likely that there is a judicial fear of open-
ing the floodgates of litigation in this area. The cases examined herein
indicate that the judiciary may be a bit too active in their judicial “gate-
keeper” role. Several of the situations examined, such as the aforemen-
tioned case, and others within the context of discrimination and harass-
ment appear to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to pass the “gate”
and go to a jury for ultimate determination.
496
When there is a judicial determination that reasonable minds could
disagree as to the outrageous nature of the defendant’s conduct, then the
issue becomes one for the trier of fact, typically the jury, to resolve and
ascertain ultimate liability.
497
Moreover, if the outrageous conduct “is
reasonably debatable, a court cannot substitute its judgment on the facts
for that of the jury.”
498
For example, in Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc.,
499
the employer’s supervisor threatened a co-worker and current employee
with termination unless the co-worker evicted the plaintiff, a former em-
ployee, from the home the plaintiff shared with the co-worker.
500
Conse-
quently, the plaintiff was forced to find a new place to live.
501
The court
held that “reasonable minds could differ”
502
as to whether the supervi-
sor’s conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liabil-
ity, and thus the plaintiff raised an issue of fact on this element for the
jury to resolve.
503
However, it should be noted that many courts require
493. Id.
494. Id. at 1363.
495. Id.
496. See id.
497. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 46 cmt. h (1965); see also Carnemolla v. Walsh,
815 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149,
1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex.
2002); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex. 1999); Williams v. First Tenn.
Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex. App. 2003); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397,
407 (Tex. App. 2002); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
498. LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
499. 84 S.W.3d 397, 475 (Tex. App. 2002).
500. Id. at 400.
501. Id. at 408.
502. Id.
503. Id.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
175
that the plaintiff produce more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position . . . there must be evidence
upon which a jury could reasonably find for plaintiff.”
504
Similarly, in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc.,
505
the employee
was discharged “without just cause or provocation” and in a humiliating
and racially insulting manner by his foreman.
506
In noting that the fore-
man was aware of plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to distress,
507
the
court ruled that reasonable people could differ as to whether the conduct
was sufficiently outrageous and thus the case went to the jury to de-
cide.
508
Notably, a jury is allowed to make a “reasonable inference” from
the facts of the case in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct is ex-
treme and outrageous.
509
Similar to the outrage issue, the question whether the distress is se-
vere enough to support the cause of action is initially a question of law
for the court to resolve. However, when reasonable minds can differ as
to the degree of severity, it becomes a question of fact for the jury.
510
For
example, in Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc.,
511
the court also held that rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether the employee suffered severe
emotional distress, and thus the plaintiff raised an issue of fact on this
element for the jury to resolve.
512
In another Texas appellate case,
513
the
employee was questioned by the defendant employer’s staff in front of
two other employees regarding the plaintiff’s use of the company credit
card. The plaintiff was allowed to retrieve his personal belongings, and
while he was being escorted out of the building, a co-worker told the
plaintiff in front of other employees that he was being terminated and
would not be rehired.
514
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s intentional
infliction claim, however, because there was “no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact” with regard to the severe distress requirement.
515
504. See, e.g., Proctor v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
505. 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970).
506. Id. at 219.
507. Id. at 218.
508. Id. at 219.
509. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 963 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
510. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832; see also Proctor, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Johnston v.
Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Utah 2002); Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp.,
97 S.W.3d 798, 805–06 (Tex. App. 2003); Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 407 (Texas
App. 2002); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
511. 84 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App. 2002).
512. Id.
513. Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App. 2003).
514. Id. at 805.
515. Id. at 805–06.
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[Vol. 21:1
In determining the requisite severity for a claim of emotional dis-
tress as a consequence of the defendant’s actions, the trier of fact is al-
lowed to consider whether the employee suffered embarrassment, sad-
ness, fear, worry, depression, humiliation, shame, as well as the degree
of such feelings.
516
The jury may also consider whether the employee
experienced physical pain and suffering, including a loss of sleep, as a
consequence of the stress, tension, and emotional agitation and turmoil
caused by the defendant’s conduct.
517
Finally, the jury can note whether
the employee required or sought medical or psychological treatment for
the distress caused by the defendant.
518
Yet other “proof of such feelings
as depression, confusion, fright, and anger and changes in physical ap-
pearance and demeanor can establish this element even if no medical
treatment is sought.”
519
Severe emotional distress, therefore, must be so
severe that “no reasonable person would be expected to put up with
it.”
520
The determination of the defendant’s intent or recklessness is re-
garded as a question of fact for the jury,
521
as is the causation issue.
522
The jury, moreover, is permitted to make “a reasonable inference from
the evidence” on the issues of causation or intent,
523
especially if there
are special factors present, such as the relationship between the parties,
the knowledge of particular susceptibility to distress, and the cumulative
pattern of the distress.
524
The assessment of damages for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress is also a question of fact for the jury.
525
As one court noted, “it is the members of the jury who, when properly
instructed, are in the best position to assess the degree of harm suffered
and to fix a monetary amount as just compensation therefore.”
526
The
516. Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 408 (Tex. App. 2002).
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. 1990); LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford,
Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605,
617 (Tex. 1999); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002).
522. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 306, at 832; see also Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1252; LaBrier, 612
S.W.2d at 793.
523. Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1252.
524. Id. at 1251–52.
525. See Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 67 (Ky. 1996) (awarding $70,000 by jury
to “peculiarly susceptible” employee for employer’s intentional infliction of emotional distress in
course of wrongfully terminating employee); GTE Southwest Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 642–43; Jackson
v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 408–09 (Texas App. 2002).
526. Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 71 (Cal. 1979).
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
177
resolution of agency issues, such as whether an employee was acting
within the scope of employment, is regarded as a question of fact for the
jury.
527
Granted, these legal and factual issues are difficult to resolve with
this intentional tort. Nonetheless, “[t]he fact that some claims may be
spurious does not mean courts should shut their eyes to the serious
wrongs.”
528
As the court stated in Agis, “[i]t is the function of courts and
juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This responsibility
should not be shunned merely because the task may be difficult to per-
form.”
529
IX. R
ECOMMENDATIONS
Since the frequency and the duration of the objectionable conduct
are important factors in determining such key components to the cause
of action as outrageousness, severity and reasonableness, the employee
is well-advised to keep a record of any pattern of distressing conduct by
his or her employer or co-workers. Although single and isolated acts are
much less likely to meet the demanding legal standards for this inten-
tional tort, one especially egregious act may be sufficient.
530
It is best for
the employee to keep in mind the counsel in Prosser and Keeton, that
the “flagrant character” of the conduct “adds especial weight to the
plaintiff’s claim, and is in itself an important guarantee that the mental
disturbance which follows is serious and not feigned.”
531
That is, if the
plaintiff lacks evidence of actual physical harm or even physical symp-
toms, the plaintiff would be well-advised to emphasize the outrageous-
ness of the wrongful conduct. The extremity of the outrage will add sub-
stantial weight to the employee’s assertion that the mental harm inflicted
on him or her is genuine and severe, and neither pretended nor trivial.
532
As succinctly stated by Dobbs, “[t]he requirement of outrageous conduct
serves to limit the tort, but the same requirement also serves to provide
strong evidence that severe harm has in fact resulted.”
533
Thus, a favor-
able factual finding on the seminal outrage question should also produce
527. GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 617–18.
528. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1976) (quoting Samms v. Ec-
cles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961)).
529. Id.
530. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 §12, at 60, 62.
531. Id. at 57.
532. Id. at 64.
533. D
OBBS
, supra note 2 § 303, at 826.
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[Vol. 21:1
a concomitant favorable decision on not only the severity issue but also
the reasonableness of the severity.
534
The outrageousness of the defen-
dant’s conduct thereby provides the assurance that the asserted severe
emotional distress is in fact real. Nevertheless, it is important to empha-
size that even though evidence of physical impact, harm or physical
symptoms is not technically required, some type of evidence as to the
presence, severity and reasonableness of the emotional distress suffered
as a result of the outrage typically will be required.
535
Considering all the difficulties involved in sustaining the tort, the
plaintiff, therefore, is advised to construct a legally and factually well-
crafted case, presented by a believable aggrieved party substantiated by
convincing evidence, including a credible psychiatric or medical expert
witness. As underscored in Prosser and Keeton, the role of the courts is
not to abandon the tort, but to exercise some “common sense”; and thus
“what is required is rather a careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting
the claim,” so as to distinguish “true claims from false ones.”
536
Accord-
ingly, the employee is well-advised to specify as clearly and in as much
detail as possible the dates, times, types and mode of conduct on which
the plaintiff is relying to substantiate his or her claim of extreme and
outrageous misconduct and consequent severe emotional distress.
The perpetrators of the misconduct must be identified, of course.
The plaintiff should also note whether the misconduct was reported to
supervisory and/or managerial personnel of the employer, and whether
the employer took efforts to investigate the facts asserted by the em-
ployee to remedy the employee’s complaint. Obviously, if the alleged
severe emotional distress was inflicted by a supervisor or manager of the
defendant employer, that key fact must be noted and underscored. If the
misconduct occurred over a period of time, the time frame must be duly
noted since any pattern of misconduct is another key component to the
employee sustaining a case. Finally, if the employee had a known spe-
cial susceptibility to the emotional distress, either generally or to the ac-
tions of the defendant employer’s representatives, the employee must
state that susceptibility as well as the substantiating facts.
One cannot sufficiently emphasize how critical it will be for the
employee, in order to sustain this ill-defined and highly fact-specific tort,
to spell out in detail the underlying “outrage” facts as well as any exac-
erbating factors. It is also necessary to clearly differentiate and separate
534. Id. at 832.
535. Id.
536. K
EETON ET AL
., supra note 3 § 12, at 56.
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
179
those independent tort facts from other improper behavior that may be
part of the employee’s larger wrongful discharge or employment dis-
crimination or harassment case against the employer. As a practical mat-
ter, the employee’s attorney should strive to plead additional and differ-
ent “outrageous” conduct as the basis for the tort claim while avoiding
the same facts in the larger wrongful discharge, discrimination, harass-
ment or other claim against the employer.
Another important factor is the plaintiff’s ability to point out that
the offending conduct is not directly related to the plaintiff’s employ-
ment or to their manager’s supervisory role. Thus, pleading as many dif-
ferent and extraneous intentional infliction instances as possible is a key
to a successful tort cause of action. Moreover, to further distinguish the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, it would be advisable
for the employee to point out that the state common law intentional in-
fliction tort serves a different policy goal than statutory civil rights, labor
laws or the employment-at-will doctrine.
Particularly in an employment-at-will situation, the employee’s at-
torney should focus on any egregious conduct that is different in kind
and degree from the reasons and manner of the discharge, including
post-termination conduct. The objective is to differentiate the em-
ployee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress case from the generic
“wrongful discharge” action, typically, and at times summarily, super-
seded by the conventional employment-at-will doctrine. The objective is
to differentiate the emotional distress case from the statutory civil rights
or labor relations action, which may preempt the state common law tort
action. The advice given by one federal district court is particularly in-
structive.
537
The court, noting that although termination is “inherently
unpleasant,” the employee must provide proof of “something more” in
the way of facts, such as termination conduct that was “offensive or abu-
sive.”
538
These or similar facts would distinguish the employee’s case
from the “garden variety” case of termination, discrimination or retalia-
tion.
539
If the employee’s attorney does not precisely formulate and sub-
stantiate the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the court may dismiss the employee’s tort cause of action on one
of many grounds. Predominantly, these include lack of outrage, preemp-
tion or deference (perhaps undue) to the employment-at-will doctrine.
537. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
538. Id. at 963.
539. Id.
180
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
Accordingly, the court’s position emerges “loud and clear” from this
synthesis of current case law; courts will scrutinize very carefully,
strictly, and at times severely, the instances of factual misconduct al-
leged to have given rise to the independent tort of outrage, especially in
an at will employment situation. The employee can make his or her best
case to sustain the tort through summary judgment so as to obtain a
(perhaps sympathetic) jury and to avoid the case being dismissed by the
court on a legal conclusion of lack of outrage through careful and sub-
stantive, as well as discrete and distinct factual delineation.
X. C
ONCLUSION
The cases clearly reflect a concern that an emotional distress inten-
tional tort claim generally is hard to define, easy to assert and difficult to
disprove. The tort is formulated in very general terms which can apply to
an infinite variety of conduct that can legitimately produce emotional
distress. Everyone, at some time in his or her life, has been the victim of
deliberate stressful behavior, which has produced anxiety, emotional dis-
tress and perhaps even psychological upheaval. The law, concomitantly,
has always been concerned about “opening up the floodgates” of litiga-
tion. Thus, courts are very rigorous, perhaps too much so, as to the req-
uisite components to this intentional legal wrong as well as the degree of
evidence necessary to sustain them. The case law indicates, moreover,
that the courts are quite skeptical when it comes to intentional distress
cases, frequently ruling as a matter of law that the conduct at issue is not
sufficiently outrageous for the tort. In the employment context, very
clearly, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ordinarily
will not lie, not only for “ordinary” employment disputes or standard
employment actions, such as review, appraisal, transfer and demotion,
but also for many egregious and offensive ones. A termination, even if
characterized as wrongful, will not be sufficiently extreme and outra-
geous for tort liability standing alone. Moreover, racial and sexual dis-
crimination and harassment will not alone be sufficient grounds to meet
the very demanding “outrage” and “extreme” standard. Additional, sepa-
rate and distinct misconduct will be required by the courts. The serious
problem that ensues by setting such a demanding standard for outrage as
well as severity, especially in an employment-at-will situation, is that
wrongdoers, who intend to and actually do cause emotional distress, are
shielded from legal liability. Yet, the judiciary is responsible for apply-
ing the common law, in the words of the old maxim, “to protect the
weak from the insults and abuses of the strong.” Accordingly, the judici-
2003]
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
181
ary must fulfill its obligation with this tort in the employment context
and thus develop liability standards that are clear and intelligible, which
will then prompt employers to develop policies that will prevent work-
place abuse. There are, as this article has pointed out, precedents to
guide the judiciary in the realm of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
When the employer’s conduct is coercive, retaliatory and beyond
the norms of the typical employer-employee relationship, certain courts
have found the conduct to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as
to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Workplace conduct between an employee and the employer or among
employees will rise to the level of tortious intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress more frequently in situations involving a pattern of pur-
poseful, repeated misconduct over a long period of time. This is espe-
cially true when the wrongful conduct is inflicted by the employee’s
supervisor or manager and is considered extraneous to the typical mana-
gerial function.
The law and the courts will enable the employee to sustain claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but only in extreme and
outrageous as well as frequently specialized circumstances. The initial
element of extreme and outrageous conduct emerges as crucial to the
employee’s case, not only as the first legal and factual hurdle to sustain
the case, but also because courts seem willing to infer emotional distress
from conduct that is so outrageous that one can safely say that the ubiq-
uitous “reasonable person” would suffer such emotional harm. More-
over, in the context of abuse by managerial and supervisory personnel of
the employer, especially if inflicted over a period of time and on a
known sensitive and susceptible employee, the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress can provide a fairly useful means to regulate
reprehensible and harmful behavior in the workplace. This is especially
true in the context of a “wrongful” and highly offensive discharge of an
at will employee. Because of the weighty emphasis on the outrageous-
ness of the defendant’s conduct, particularly in the employment context,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress emerges as a rather
unique, yet very fluid and supple, legal vessel. The three key aforemen-
tioned factors of (1) abuse of managerial relationship, (2) pattern and du-
ration of distress, and (3) employee susceptibility, will bolster signifi-
cantly the employee’s case, but will also provide some structure and
guidance to this rather amorphous “outrageous” legal wrong.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as revealed
by this article, is more than a mere academic “hornbook” notion. Admit-
182
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 21:1
tedly and evidently, there are difficulties with this intentional tort as an
independent legal wrong and as a legal wrong applied in the private em-
ployment sector, especially in the employment-at-will context. Nonethe-
less, the cases and commentary presented, studied and analyzed for this
article indicate that this tort can provide some degree of legal protection
to the private sector employee in helping to regulate the workplace and
to prevent retaliatory, coercive, abusive, discriminatory and harassing
misconduct. Moreover, the at will employee, who feels that he or she
was terminated in an improper and unjust manner, will find that this tra-
ditional intentional tort cause of action can be another legal means to
supplement the employee’s “wrongful discharge” case. Ultimately, how-
ever, the responsibility falls on the judiciary as the guardians of the
common law to delineate this tort more precisely and then to apply it
more forcefully, especially in the private employment sector. This will
provide a viable legal instrument to counterbalance the inherent inequal-
ity of economic bargaining power in the typical employment relation-
ship.
Posted by at No comments:

A review of the Dr. Hector P. Garcia Founding Chapter of the American GI Forum's special bank account

Money went to local GI Forum
Review finds funds from '99 suit spent on chapter

By adriana garza Caller-Times
September 9, 2006


A review of the Dr. Hector P. Garcia Founding Chapter of the American GI Forum's special bank account indicates that money from a 1999 lawsuit has been spent on chapter business, members said at a press conference Friday.

Former founder's chapter commander Ram Chavez, who has been expelled by the national organization, and two other members of the Founding Chapter paid for the review conducted by a local accounting firm.





The review indicates $33,852 was deposited in the chapter's special account from the building fund lawsuit in 2000.

Chavez said the money is what was left of a $57,000 payment to the chapter as a result of the lawsuit.

The suit, filed by several local GI Forum chapters, was against the nonprofit National Archives & Historical Foundation of the American GI Forum and several of its directors.

The chapters claimed that the foundation denied them access to money in a building fund controlled by the foundation.

Members also alleged they were not allowed to join the foundation.

Through mediation, the founder's chapter was paid a sum of money. Two former chapter members and the National Board of Directors have asked to review documents that detail how they claim the $50,000 the chapter received from suit was spent, but the chapter did not turn over records.

In July, the national organization suspended the Founding Chapter, citing the chapter's failure to turn over financial documents. Two weeks later, the chapter was reinstated.

Chavez said the chapter spent about $23,000 on attorney and court costs, in addition to reimbursing local GI forum members who contributed to help fund the lawsuit.

Since the money was deposited in 2000, it has been used for convention expenses, including transportation, registration and hosting the state convention in 2004, according to the audit.

Some of the money also was used for slot machines in 2001 before the machines were banned in the county, Chavez said. Once they became illegal, the chapter shut down the machines that raised about $4,500 in revenue for the chapter.

Internal struggles between the national organization and the Founding Chapter over the disclosure of the financial documents have been the focus of much of the controversy surrounding the chapter in recent years.

Chapter members said they felt they were treated unfairly by the national organization but believed they were vindicated by the review, which conducted by the Swank and Salch accounting firm.

"The chapter never believed this was a legit issue," said Bob Ortiz, interim commander of the Founding Chapter. "We feel the cloud over us is now gone."

For years, the National American GI Forum has inquired as to the accountability of the chapter regarding a lawsuit filed seven years ago by Dr. Xico Garcia, brother of GI Forum founder Dr. Hector P. Garcia.

Ortiz said the chapter will present the review to the state GI Forum Board of Directors at today's meeting.

Contact Adriana Garza at 886-3618 or HYPERLINK mailto:garzaa@caller.com garzaa@caller.com
Posted by at No comments:

Saturday, September 02, 2006

This is not about Solly, it is about SPTX members perpetrating fraud as Democrats.

Saturday, September 02, 2006

HD33 has Ortiz, McComb and Noyola

The filing is over for partisan Perry's special election in HD 33. The real race is between the general election candidates, Solomon Ortiz Jr. and Joe McComb. Smart money says Danny Noyola's vanity run will have little effect on the outcome.

posted by CouldBeTrue @ 7:52 AM

12 Comments:

At 12:31 PM, batoxxx said...

Communist in CC?
Sadly, it is true. The most radical wing of the Socialist Party in the USA has penetrated the Democratic Party in Corpus Christi... I did not believe until one of the members here in El Valle (member of the El Partido Socialista De Valle) show me his minutes of where John Kelley and Les Cassidy had let it be known that the CCPPC... THE CORPUS CHRISTI PROGRESSIVE POPULIST PARTY was used to accomplish radical socialist aims. The leader here Raul Cano, of the Partido Socialista, call it a "reconstruction of society"... a total revolution, nada less.
How sad. This will only set our party back. Hope you call in Corpus Christi are not stupid as we were here in El Valle. Allowing that crazy Cano to lure many a Democratic (some prect chairs and even the son of a prominent state offical) to penetrate.
I will pray for the party. What can we do here. Do you have any suggestions. These leaders here are bragging how Corpus Corpus will be the model for other "overthrows."

At 12:33 PM, batoxxx said...

I've heard that John Kelley is Solomon Ortiz Jr. Mentor.

Hey, Democrats are not communists. I under the Democratic Women group in Corpus also channelled $ to John Kelley and the Progressives? $2000?

At 2:28 PM, CouldBeTrue said...

batoxxx.

what a load of cr*p you are selling! John Kelley has spoken for himself - he is a progressive not a communist. Please try and educate yourself as to the difference, if you can manage that.

As for Kelley being Ortiz Jr.'s mentor, you are clearly, clearly full of it! Ortiz Jr. has had a life of politics and several years as Nueces County Democratic chair. Ask Alex Garcia if that job isn't an instant education!

At 3:00 PM, YaGottaLoveIt said...

batoxxx,

You know John Kelley is not a communist. You're just a nasty little prick who's upset because John decided not to do business with a thief and a bully anymore. Save your prayers for yourself, because you are going straight to hell for being a liar and a cheat.

At 4:20 PM, batoxxx said...

Am I lying? Are you sure?

There is a paper trail that the radical Socialists left behind. I am waiting on some paperwork (minutes so forth). I will post them here on Monday, so as you all won't make same "negligent" mistakes we make here by allowing Raul Cano (head of El Partido Socialista) be allowed to penetrate. The care calling for the destruction of U.S. society. He is a good friend (comrade, he calls Kelly and Less and abel cavada)...

May u see the light of truth before it is too late. It is not crap.

At 5:00 PM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

There is significant documentation showing active membership in the SPTX.

Comrade John Kelley has undermined South Texas.

Digital documents already exists. There is an agreement allowing Comrade Kelley to be forthright.

Monday will vindicate Homero.

Theif & Bully?

The name calling says it all.

At 5:07 PM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

I don't know about the relationship between Solly and Comrade John Kelley.

Having the power to broadcasts to South Texas is a reasonable reason for Solly to be lured into close proximity.

At 5:35 PM, batoxxx said...

Homero, in my opinion, is sounding the bell when Solomon Ortiz Jr. should have as Nueces Democratic Chair to inform the party. Instead, he the rats in...

At 6:21 PM, CouldBeTrue said...

there are differences between a socialist, a progressive, and a Democrat. NONE are communists by definition.

See wikipedia - Socialist

Progressive

Democrat

batoxxx,

it is completely obnoxious of you to say you and you alone have the right to define another person's political beliefs. How dare you!!

At 7:49 PM, islandrat said...

Lets see, Its ok for anyone to say hate and Sh*t on Right raido but when a Demo candidate wants to get on the free airwaves of airamerica they are communist?

The truth is that Homero printed the We the People Paper for John kelly, when Kelly then found a cheaper printer he droped homero and the Defenzor print shop.

So now Homero is pissed that he is losing $$$ from Ads and the printing of We the people.

Homero is a Journalist for hire, anyone who is in politics can tell you that. Many politications pay him to write Trash....

Its all economics, not Socialism.
Money talks for Homero and Kelly.

PERIOD!

At 8:30 PM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

As I understand Comrade John Kelley is in arrears as is the local Air America affiliations.

"it is completely obnoxious of you to say you and you alone have the right to define another person's political beliefs."

WATT are the political beliefs of the SPTX?

In South Texas anything of the nature of SPTX we lump together with the word Communist. So, Comrade Kelley is a Socialist and that is completely within his right as an American; but he is slaiming he is a Democrat and is speaking of getting rid of people within the Democratic Party while he is a Socialist not a Democrat. When one goes on to a station affiliated with this ideology the ideology transfers through association. If you sleep with dogs you are gonn get fleas.


"The truth is that Homero printed the We the People Paper for John kelly, when Kelly then found a cheaper printer he droped homero and the Defenzor print shop.

So now Homero is pissed that he is losing $$$ from Ads and the printing of We the people."

The truth is if Homero would not have helped and nurtured the existence of John Kelley's show and newspaper it would never have sprouted up. It would have been stomped from the beginning. Where were these "cheaper printers" when "We the People" was to be the "Red Snapper" and the Radio Program was called Media Focus.

As for Journalist for hire; everybody likes to get paid for their work. Will Homero write for something he does not believe in?

I think not. Homero is a mentor in my eyes. I am my own man and when this first hit the fan I was pissed off at Homero. I told him and we did not speak to each other. During this time I began to study the things Homero was talking about. I tried to find another explanation for the things (I believed to be untrue) Homer was saying. It turns out through the research I found the SPTX and Comrade Kelley and Comrade Cassidy and Comrade Cavada and Mrs Comrade Cavada. This in itself was not enough so I delved into the "paper trail". The direction, mentality and clandestine agenda is something one cannot deny.

Roght now, I know how you guys feel cause I too once had the same lumps in my throat. I believed.

Once you guys read the information if you choose to deny that is your right. However, I choose to counter the movement. You guys will always be my friends and my allies. Please do not make it personal?

As for it being about money:

"It is the advertiser who provides the paper for the subscriber. It is not to be disputed, that the publisher of a newspaper in this country, without a very exhaustive advertising support, would receive less reward for his labor than the humblest mechanic."

Alexander Hamilton

At 8:38 PM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

The evidence speaks for itself.

Progressive is a noble cause but corrupted and disingenuous from the beginning.

They are laughing at South Texas.

On Monday (Labor Day) we will make the information readily accessible in the digital format.

Then, the decision to admit or deny will be an educated and informed one.

I once believed in the Progressive Democrat. The label is an oxymoron.

Now we have discussed the DINO and we all know how we feel regarding the deception. How can one be a member of the SPTX and run for office as a Democrat? IMO, this Political Bigomy?

Infidelity and deception?

With Malice and Forethought?

With intent to defraud and harm?

Why dont John Kelly just come out and admit it to South Texas?

Tell us how we (South Texas) will be better off following your dream and the platform of the SP-TX.

Don't bullsh/t us no more John Kelly. Or is it Kelley?

The perfect line up for Air America would be Moctemoc's Door in the Morning and Joe Flores' "And Justice For All" every afternoon.

WATTA ya think Mr Zepeda?

COMRADE is that WATT we shall call each other from now on?

Shozz Bot........ Nano, Nano

http://texasplatica.blogspot.com/2006/08/corpus-christi-progressive-populist.html


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Thursday, August 31, 2006

It's official. Noyola's ego wins.

Choosing his own bruised ego over uniting the Nueces County Democratic party, Danny Noyola announced he's running in the State House District 33 special election.
Noyola will announce he's running during a press conference at Taqueria Jalisco, 5338 Kostoryz, said Connie Gutierrez, one of his campaign supporters. The press conference begins at 5:45 p.m.
See previous post.

Update: Vince over at the Capitol Annex thinks it's stuipid, stupid, stupid for Danny to run.

posted by CouldBeTrue @ 5:40 PM

13 Comments:

At 8:42 PM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

Did he pay a filing fee?

How much was it?

or 500 people petiton?

At 9:12 PM, tejana3 said...

"I was raised a Democrat" he swears
But bad news for us he always bears
He is not a “DINO like the last one”
But from loyalty he will run

Oh poor Danny he cannot make sense
How was he a teacher with no intelligence?
There goes Connie screaming and crying
While the man keeps on conniving

Oh dear Danny, YOU’RE BEING USED
But it seems you like to be abused
You say you want the extra step
Don’t you care about your rep?

You are not even clear on the rules
You make your family look like fools
You and Mike Chavez need some silence
All yall preach is negativity and violence

Don’t go file, you slimy creep
You make us Tejanos want to weep

At 10:05 PM, sera verdad said...

Jaime, the filing fee is to be paid at the sec. of state. And the fee is 750.00. no petition no time.

At 11:23 PM, dannoynted1 said...

is he going to be on the ticket for just the next 2 months or is he eligible for the race decided by the precinct chairs?

At 1:40 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

Does that mean Solly and Joe Mac have to pay two filing fees?

Now, at least it will be a vote of the constituents of HD #33.

So all of the chair massages and the loophole process was to teach us one thing.

The next time somebody resigns we call the Governor and remind him, "It is within Gov. Perry's authority to call a special election," and make it a point from now on.

Practice Due Diligence.

At 2:03 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

Texas State Representative House District 33: STATEMENT OF SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, JR. DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE FOR STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 33

At 4:47 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

"IN THE KNOW": John Kelly: You are not from here Comrade.

Distance yourself PEOPLE!

At 5:50 AM, CouldBeTrue said...

If by some chance Danny won the special election, he would only be in office for two months. Then, the winner of the general election would take office. During those two months, the legislature would probably not be in session. If Solly wins, then he gets two extra months of senority.

Danny does nothing to help his district or to help Democrats. This run is on pure ego.

At 8:44 AM, herownself said...

Hurry, hurry. Get your muskets. The firing squad begains again.

At 9:07 AM, CouldBeTrue said...

herownself,

Are you saying Noyola shouldn't run again, too, with the 'firing squad' comment?

At 6:54 PM, YaGottaLoveIt said...

After his bizarre "Nobody loves me, everybody hates me, guess I'll go eat worms" concession speach when he lost the precinct chairs vote to Solly, I doubt if I could vote for Danny, no matter how sorry I felt for him. I'm not a Danny-hater -- I just don't think he has the temperment for the job. I understand it was an emotional time for him, but he needed to be a man about it. Whining about people being mean to him just made him look weak and pathetic. Politics is a tough business and requires a thick skin. I didn't support Solly because I hated Danny. I supported Solly because I was impressed with the maturity and poise he had demonstrated as party chair, and because I believed he was the best person to represent the constituants in District 33.

At 11:09 PM, batoxxx said...

Communist in CC?
Sadly, it is true. The most radical wing of the Socialist Party in the USA has penetrated the Democratic Party in Corpus Christi... I did not believe until one of the members here in El Valle (member of the El Partido Socialista De Valle) show me his minutes of where John Kelley and Les Cassidy had let it be known that the CCPPC... THE CORPUS CHRISTI PROGRESSIVE POPULIST PARTY was used to accomplish radical socialist aims. The leader here Raul Cano, of the Partido Socialista, call it a "reconstruction of society"... a total revolution, nada less.
How sad. This will only set our party back. Hope you call in Corpus Christi are not stupid as we were here in El Valle. Allowing that crazy Cano to lure many a Democratic (some prect chairs and even the son of a prominent state offical) to penetrate.
I will pray for the party. What can we do here. Do you have any suggestions. These leaders here are bragging how Corpus C,

At 3:30 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

Corpus Christi Caller Times: Rolando Garza and Joe Ortiz Practiced Due Diligence on Hot Potato George Moff

Comrade John Martinez:I represented the appraisal district when George Moff (former Nueces County Chief Appraiser convicted of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,500) was accused of improper spending.

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Thursday, August 31, 2006

Talking back

Progressives in Corpus Christi are being called communists in an apparent effort to tear the Nueces County Democrats apart. Why would anyone allow someone like Bob Jones define them and what they believe? I won't.

Everyone at South Texas Chisme speaks for themselves. The following is what I believe as a progressive.

The preamble to the constitution of the United States starts as follows:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
In Order to establish Justice means fair treatment under the law. It doesn't mean justice for those who can buy it. Domestic tranquility and providing for the common defense means basic safety and peace in the 'persuit of happiness'. It doesn't mean attacking other countries to take their assets.

Promote the general welfare means taking the side of the citizens over corporate profits when the air is polluted, parks are destroyed, and healthcare, transportation and clean water are denied to all but the super wealthy. It doesn't mean selling out public assets to the highest bidder. And, it doesn't mean taking the side of corporations to detriment of workers' health, safety or ability to earn a living.

The blessing of liberty means freedom to speak our minds, freedom to go our own way and make our own mistakes. It doesn't mean we can be spied upon by our government. It doesn't mean an intimidated press. It doesn't mean that a certain type of religious leader can impose his beliefs and enslave us with his theocracy.

Today's Republicans have attacked the very basic tenets of our constitution and our government. Republicans and Democrats used to be able to agree on these basic tenets. No more.

The Republican PR machine has taken up and made it down. They've taken the meaning of patriot and the meaning of freedom and turned them upside down. Patriot means underming the constitution. Freedom means theocracy. I'm not buying it.

posted by CouldBeTrue @ 9:33 AM

5 Comments:

At 11:05 PM, batoxxx said...

Sadly, it is true. The most radical wing of the Socialist Party in the USA has penetrated the Democratic Party in Corpus Christi... I did not believe until one of the members here in El Valle (member of the El Partido Socialista De Valle) show me his minutes of where John Kelley and Les Cassidy had let it be known that the CCPPC... THE CORPUS CHRISTI PROGRESSIVE POPULIST PARTY was used to accomplish radical socialist aims. The leader here Raul Cano, of the Partido Socialista, call it a "reconstruction of society"... a total revolution, nada less.
How sad. This will only set our party back. Hope you call in Corpus Christi are not stupid as we were here in El Valle. Allowing that crazy Cano to lure many a Democratic (some prect chairs and even the son of a prominent state offical) to penetrate.
I will pray for the party. What can we do here. Do you have any suggestions. These leaders here are bragging how Corpus C

At 4:05 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

The evidence speaks for itself.

Progressive is a noble cause but corrupted and disingenuous from the beginning.

They are laughing at South Texas.

On Monday (Labor Day) we will make the information readily accessible in the digital format.

Then, the decision to admit or deny will be an educated and informed one.

I once believed in the Progressive Democrat. The label is an oxymoron.

Now we have discussed the DINO and we all know how we feel regarding the deception. How can one be a member of the SPTX and run for office as a Democrat? IMO, this Political Bigomy?

Infidelity and deception?

With Malice and Forethought?

With intent to defraud and harm?

Why dont John Kelly just come out and admit it to South Texas?

Tell us how we (South Texas) will be better off following your dream and the platform of the SP-TX.

Don't bullsh/t us no more John Kelly. Or is it Kelley?

The perfect line up for Air America would be Moctemoc's Door in the Morning and Joe Flores' "And Justice For All" every afternoon.

WATTA ya think Mr Zepeda?

COMRADE is that WATT we shall call each other from now on?

Shozz Bot........ Nano, Nano

At 4:19 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

WATT’S that rumble do you think you hear

Is it loathing, is it fear

Or is the virus exiting from our rear.

Ram Chavez letter to Tony Morales (tomorrow)

Democrat or Progressive?

Taste Great or Les filling?

Now, tell us WATT is the definition of the following words: Socialismo, Solidarity and BTW, do you know by now who is the “SPTX Independent” to challenge for District 27? Or “Just like everything else those crazy dreams just kinda came and went” Jack & Diane. Socialist ideology? Be forthright with your presentation do not come here accept our gracious hospitality and endearment; while you infiltrate and undermine as an “Out of the Box Democrat”. DINO no,…???? THAT LABEL IS MOST UNFITTING ….... SPDINO, now that is most apropos, no? Most South Texans consider Socialism and Communism as just plain ole Communism so don’t try and baffle us with the philosophical / ideological BS. We smelled it but just couldn’t locate the Bull and to find out the aroma originated from the STEER. Now it is time to go to market and you will market yourself as a different breed of stock. You have not the DNA of a Democrat. You are not from here Comrade.

Roland Garza called a Communist because of association

Roland is PRO Union and he is Democrat.

Distance yourself PEOPLE!

That is all I will tell you.

Good Luck

http://ccintheknow.blogspot.com/2006/09/john-kelly-you-are-not-from-here.html

At 7:15 AM, Jaime Kenedeño said...

Verbum sapienti sat est

At 5:34 PM, batoxxx said...

Homero, in my opinion, is sounding the bell when Solomon Ortiz Jr. should have as Nueces Democratic Chair to inform the party. Instead, he the rats in...


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With respect to your opinion, I humbly disagree. Homero trusted these Comrades. Homero is a very intelligent and very secretive. He does not trust easily. Homero seen something in John Kelley to help a whole South Texas. Homer also seen a business opportunity and a financial reward in the future. As of right now, the Advertisement profits are insignificant; more like non-existent. So it has nothing to do with Homer being "pissed that he is losing $$$ from Ads" .

"And the printing of We the people."

Air America & affiliates have reneged on several committments; so this statement is accurate in reference to economics. It causes friction and it communicates disrespect when, it is worth the price when one wants the services or product; but after the fact, after one has recieved the crucial services or product, all of the sudden one develops the mindset that "it aint worth it". Maybe the actual service can be purchased for a "Cheaper Price" but where were the "Cheaper Price" guys at the genesis? Nobody would help these three Comrades. Also, when Homero was printing the paper, when others were allied with the local Air America affiliates and Mr Zepeda; there was a dynamic that cannot be purchased. The whole can become greater than the sum of its parts to the extent those parts are different, and to the extent those differences are handled creatively. It is called Synergy and Diversity. Local Air America Affiliates never did their part and still patience was extended. Homero was way more than just the printer. These Comrades will never appreciate South Texas.

So my point is, the SPTX poked Homero's eyes and they poked my eyes and they poked Solly's eyes and they are still poking many loyal souls eyes. I respect the loyalty, but nonetheless loyalty is a two way street and it starts with being upfront, forthright and honest about who you are. Did any of us know this newspaper and this radio station was a tool controlled by the SPTX?

So it is not Solly who is at fault. Even if at some point he discovered that this affiliation he has included in his plans and has grown reliant on; is questionable in light of new evidence. Even so, the method he may have chosen was more covert in nature? He can easily blow them off once in Austin. Although this is true for John Kelley and Air America affiliates; the same does not hold true for Homero and Los Kenedenos. This is not about Solly, it is about SPTX members perpetrating fraud as Democrats.
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Roland Garza and Joe Ortiz Represented The People when George Moff (former Nueces County Chief Appraiser convicted of theft of property


The Races 2006

Nueces County Court

January 22, 2006


There's a five-way race for Nueces County Court at Law No. 3 judge in the March primary, with Democrats Hector DePena Jr., Joe Flores, Michele Villarreal-Kuchta, John Martinez and Mark Skurka vying for the seat Judge Marisela Saldana is vacating to run for district judge. County Court at Law judges preside over matters including Class A and B criminal misdemeanor cases, probate cases, civil lawsuits up to $100,000, mental health cases and appeals from justice of the peace courts. The position pays $110,965 annually and judges serve four-year terms. The winner will face Republican Juan Reyna in the November general election. Early voting begins Feb. 21 for the March 7 primary.

PHOTO

Hector DePena Jr.

Age: 62

Occupation: Judge

Q:What is the most important lesson you learned in your legal career?

A: Respect for the law and respect for people.

Q: What's your take on the current jury selection system?

A: As slow as the process is and as difficult as it is, particularly when you report for jury duty, I still think we have the best system because it allows the citizenry to participate in the administration of justice.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: I was the presiding judge of County Court at Law 2 for 16 years and I am currently a state regional judge, which is a roving judge. I work within 11 counties, so whenever there is a need for an alternate judge, like when a judge recuses himself or an additional judge is needed, I am there to do the job.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: I was the presiding judge of County Court at Law 2 for 16 years and I am currently a state regional judge, which is a roving judge. I work within 11 counties, so whenever there is a need for an alternate judge, like when a judge recuses himself or an additional judge is needed, I am there to do the job.

PHOTO

Joe Flores

Age: 38

Occupation: Lawyer

Q:What is the most important lesson you have learned in your legal career?

A: That each person has intrinsic value. What I mean by that is that being a lawyer is one of the most humbling experiences I have had. Representing the poorest of the poor or the richest of the rich, you still have the duty and obligation to do your job.

Q:What's your take on the current jury selection system?

A: The current system is one that I think works. The jury system is vital to our court system here in the U.S. Very few countries have the system we have and I think it is one of the best in the world if not the best. It does have some inconveniences, but we know people will get the most fair shake they can when they go to court.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: As an attorney, I have had multiple trials involving civil, criminal and administrative experiences, which have provided me with the confidence and experience that I will need to preside over cases. The most important part is my experience in business, education, health care and the law, which makes me the most experienced candidate because I have a diverse background.

PHOTO

Michele Villarreal-Kuchta

Age: 38

Occupation: Lawyer

Q:What is the most important lesson you have learned in your legal career?

A: To listen to both sides of every story.

Q:What's your take on the current jury selection system?

A: I think it's the best we've got. It has stood the test of time, so why fix what is not broken.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: I think I have a lot of experience in evaluating case scenarios. I believe I can apply fairness in all situations and evaluate and assess like I have done with my own cases. And I will make my decisions according to the law.

PHOTO

John Martinez

Age: 32

Occupation: Lawyer

Q: What is the most important lesson you have learned in your legal career?

A: It's more points that you come across that remind you of what you are doing. I was in a trial in Abilene, and we were picking a jury. One gentleman (a recent U.S. citizen) had a death in the family. When the judge asked if he wanted to be excused he said no, he wanted to be on the jury, and he got on. He said being on the jury was part of being a citizen. We take so much for granted here with the system that we have and the system that is in place.

Q: What's your take on the current jury selection system?

A: Picking a jury can be very complicated, so it is not a question of having a perfect system. I don't know that there is a better way. Although there are problems with it, I think overall it is the best way.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: When I was in law school I did an internship with the district attorney's office so I got a taste of criminal law, but of course most of my experience is in the civil area. I represented the appraisal district when George Moff (former Nueces County Chief Appraiser convicted of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,500) was accused of improper spending. I also represented the county on the 30-year-old boundary dispute with San Patricio County. I'm young, but I have done some cool stuff.

PHOTO

Mark Skurka

Age: 46

Occupation: Assistant district attorney

Q: What is the most important lesson you have learned in your legal career?

A: To be prepared. Preparation is the key to everything in the courtroom. What most people see in the courtroom is just a result of many hours of preparation outside of the courtroom.

Q: What's your take on the current jury selection system?

A: The jury system that we have in America may not be perfect, but it is sure a lot better than what other countries have. So far, no one has come up with a better way of dispensing justice than having 12 of your peers deciding.

Q: How does your record as an attorney translate to the judiciary?

A: My experience in the courtroom shows people that I have more knowledge of courtroom proceedings. I am the only candidate board certified in criminal law and my background in administration in the district attorney's office makes me the best candidate to serve the people as County Court at Law Judge 3.

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Tuesday, August 22, 2006

WATT Dirty Politics were Employed

Demoted Miller Principal Wants
to be State Representative
Local DJ accuses Noyola of assault
By John Kelley
Danny Noyola Sr., alleged assailant of local radio host Roland
Garza and demoted Miller High School Principal, has filed to be
the candidate for the 33 rd Legislative District, formerly occupied
by Vilma Luna. Noyola, rumored to be handpicked by Luna
and local power broker, Mikal Watts, was demoted to Assistant
Principal at Moody High School over allegations of mismanagement
at Miller High School last year. In addition on August 3 rd ,
an assault complaint was filed with the Corpus Christi City
Police against Noyola for attacking local radio host, and former
mayoral candidate, Roland Garza in his radio booth during his
broadcast of his show “What’s Your Point?” on Magic 93.5 FM.
A Twisted Road in the Democratic Process
Local insiders believed as early as last December that Luna, who
has been a Democratic handmaiden to Tom Craddick, Majority
Leader of the State Republican Legislature, would resign to

page 14
accept a lucrative lobbying position. When Democrats
left the state in 2003 to thwart Tom Delay’s redistricting
plan to create a Republican Majority, Luna stayed behind.
She has been widely seen in Democratic circles as
more than willing to carry water for the Republicans in
order to get key committee appointments. When rumors
of her resignation circulated, Solomon Ortiz Jr. started
testing the water for a run to replace her. When she
decided to stay and run in the primary, Ortiz decided
not to run; oddly the Republicans didn’t put up a candidate
either.
Luna made the announcement on morning of July 5 th
that she was going to resign. Two to three days before
Danny Noyola Jr., Noyola operative Mike Chavez and
persons having a caller ID of the Watts Law firm contacted
all of the Democratic Precinct Chairmen and
asked them to attend a meeting at Las Espuelas Restaurant
at McArdle and Staples at noon on July 5 th to discuss
internal Democratic Party business. Noyola, Luna, and
Watts met with Democratic Party Chairman that same
morning before Luna’s announcement.
When the Precinct Chairs showed up at noon expecting
to discuss internal party business, most had not yet
heard of Luna’s resignation. They found a podium full
of microphones and all of the television station cameras
already in place. Danny Noyola Jr., with Hugo Berlanga
standing behind him announced that Luna had resigned
and went on to give a glowing recommendation for his
father to fill the position. Precinct chairs where handed
endorsements for Noyola Sr. to sign. Many said they felt
deceived and refused to sign. Others said they later
regretted signing before they found out anyone else was
in the race. Within hours the Watts Law firm invited all
of the Precinct Chairs to be their guests at Whataburger
field where they were encouraged to vote for Noyola.
In addition to Luna and Watts appearing to attempt to
handpick her successor, she gave the Republicans a gift
by resigning. Had she stated before the primary that she
would be moving out of the district before election day,
and therefore unable to serve, the Republicans would
have been unable to put up a candidate for the November
election. By resigning instead, not only did she deny
the Democratic voters a chance to select their candidate,
she gave the Republicans a chance to nominate a candidate
for the November election. Joe McCombs, former
Republican County Judge candidate announced that he
will run against Noyola soon after.
Both candidates will be nominated by the 43 sitting
Precinct Chairs of the Democratic and Republican precincts,
not the 90,000 voters in the District. With one
precinct chair open in the Democratic Party Precincts, as
few as twenty-two people will make the decision about
who will represent the party in the fall election.
Noyola had been demoted at the end of the school year
by Mary Kelley, interim superintendent of CCISD on the
recommendation of Scott Eliff, Asst. Superintendent
with the approval of the school board. These were facts
generally known in the community. So why would Luna
pick someone with obvious baggage that had still not
fully surfaced, but surely would by November? Some
observers have speculated that the support of Noyola by
Luna and Watts is an attempt to thwart the nomination
of Solomon Ortiz Jr. to the seat and put up Noyola as a
weaker candidate against McComb. Watts has supported
both Democratic and Republican candidates in
the past. It is almost a certainty that Ortiz would have
beat Noyola in a primary run. The apparent Republican
collaborator, Luna, accepted a high paying lobbying job
in Austin last week.
Miller High School Allegations Unresolved
Most of the concerns around Miller High School revolve
around allegations that Noyola was off campus and
unavailable much of the time, that he was inconsistent,
failed to follow through, changed the dress code on his
own in violation of board policy, failed to provide adequate
supervision to Assistant Principals who changed
grades and attendance in violation of state law, and
treated teachers with a lack of respect. We the People
talked to a number of teachers and administrators who
asked that their names not be used because they remain
in the system and were concerned about retaliation.
Some of those contacted stated they had been contacted
by Republican candidate, Joe McCombs, and that they
had shared the same information with him. All of the
allegations contained here were confirmed by other faculty
and staff members or documentation.
The overriding allegation was that Noyola was rarely
there and favored Asst. Principals Claude Axel and Dr.
Denise Hutchinson over principals who teachers and
staff saw as trying to do their jobs with little support. Dr.
Hutchinson was also said to be out of school frequently
with one Assistant Principal saying that they didn’t
think Dr. Hutchinson was there one complete week the
whole year. Axel was said to be repeatedly absent from
his area of responsibility on the second floor, and that no
one knew where he was nor did he respond to his radio
at times.
A repeated complaint from those interviewed was that
Mr. Noyola “was all talk, no action”. Noyola unilaterally
and in violation of board policy told students that as
long as they maintained a 92% attendance rate they
would be allowed to ignore the District dress code. Staff
said despite the lack of maintaining that attendance rate
the dress code was never reestablished. Miller had one
of the lower high school attendance rates in the district.
Discipline was said by all interviewees to deteriorate
with inconsistent handling of discipline problems, with
students preferring to see Hutchinson and/or Axel who
were said to have handed out minimal responses to
discipline violations. Faculty and staff who had been
there several years stated that faculty morale and student
behavior both declined dramatically under
Noyola’s leadership. Eight of twelve math teachers and
a number of other teachers left the district or asked for
transfers; most stating they would not continue to work
with Noyola as principal. Teachers must put in their
intention and requests for transfer before the end of the
year, which is when Noyola’s reassignment was made
public. What is very clear from interviewing teachers
and staff is that they had no respect for Noyola as a
principal and reported that many students felt the same.
Violations of State Law
Miller is a PEG school, meaning that its past performance
let parents transfer their children to other schools
for not meeting state standards. While TAKS scores did
increase in science and math, the interviewees all stated
it was due to extraordinary efforts on the part of math
and science departments despite conditions. With an
almost total turnover in the math department, continued
progress in that area is at risk.
A major part of the rules that give school a PEG rating
are attendance rates. Events surrounding one student in
particular seemed to bring the crisis to a head. One
student with a severe attendance problem can make the
difference in a school’s rating.
The student who was not named in a heavily redacted
set of emails obtained by WTP became the center of the
battle for Miller’s status and the cause of Mr. Noyola’s
eventual demotion. The student who was reported by
teachers to have attended only 3-5 classes for the entire
year, had both grades and attendance changed by Assistant
Principal, Dr. Denise Hutchinson. A series of emails
(found in a report to Carlos Cavazos, CCISD Police
Chief, that was obtained by WTP ) show discussions of
From front page DEMOTED PRINCIPAL
Continued on page 16
Noyola had been demoted at the end
of the school year by Mary Kelley,
interim superintendent of CCISD on
the recommendation of Scott Eliff,
Asst. Superintendent with the
approval of the school board. These
were facts generally known in the
community. So why would Luna pick
someone with obvious baggage that
had still not fully surfaced, but
surely would by November?
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